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The JRC* research programme "Industrial Hazards" considers 
the risks associated with the operation of hazardous industries, 
such  as  processing  and  energy  and  of  large  technological 
systems such as transportation. The programme is focused, at 
present, on  risk associated with major accidents, as problems 
associated with diffuse risk have been  considered in  the JRC 
Environmental  Protection programme. 
After Flixborough, Seveso, Amoco Cadiz,  Bhopal,  Mexico City, 
Sandoz,  etc. there is growing public awareness of menaces to 
public health and to the environment which result from sudden 
catastrophic events.  Public authorities, therefore, are seeking 
greater control over major hazardous industrial undertakings. An 
example of this public attention is the European Community (EC) 
directive on  "Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Ac-
tivities", no.  82/501. This directive requires the Member States 
to take the necessary measures to protect health and safety of 
the public and to protect the environment: safety reports, train-
ing and drills, incident reporting, emergency planning provisions, 
etc. 
The implementation of an adequate control of major accidents 
risks  requires  a  consistent  R  &  D  effort,  aiming  to  develop 
methods and to obtain data for the identification, evaluation and 
management of low frequency high consequences events. This 
R & D area is a very large indeed: it covers systems reliability, 
decision  theory  and  decision  support  systems,  behaviour  of 
chemicals in (industrial) processes, safe pressure relief systems 
confined and unconfined explosions, man-systems interaction, 
atmospheric diffusion of toxic substances, emergency simula-
tion  and planning. 
Many of these problems are analogous with those studied in the 
nuclear engineering field and the very considerable experience 
acquired in  the assessment of nuclear plant safety can be ap 
*  see for the abreviations the Glossary 
plied to other engineering areas. 
Actions crossing the border between nuclear/non-nuclear safe-
ty research are frequent and natural. We can mentioned at Euro-
pean level: the COST action on «Systems of Socia-Technologies 
and Industrial Safety», the research on cloud explosions carried 
out  in  the framework of the  Reactor Safety shared-cost pro-
gramme, the activity of EuReDatA sponsored by the JRC,  the 
collaboration of JRC with chemical industry for the development 
of risk analysis computer codes,  etc. 
The tasks of the JRC  in  this frame are: 
- to provide scientific support to the environmental policy of the 
EC 
- to elaborate means for the enforcement of existing Communi-
ty regulations 
- to  pursue  medium  and  long-term  studies  as  necessary 
background information for accident prevention. 
This means that the JRC activities will be carried out in  close 
collaboration with DG XI which is responsible, in association with 
DG  V,  for the Council  Directive above mentioned and for the 
development  of  the  Commission  policy  on  major  industrial 
hazards; with the DG XII/E's shared-cost programme on Major 
Technological Hazards which complements and augments the 
JRC activities to form a coherent whole and with Member State 
industries and  research  institutes in  order to assure common 
and  relevant experiments. 
This  is  the  sixth  and  last  progress  report  of the  four  years 
(1984-1987) research programme «Industrial Hazards,,, carried 
out at the lspra Establishment of the Joint Research Centre of 
the Commission of the European Communities. 
3 SUMMARY OF MAIN  RESULTS 
The JRC  research programme "Industrial Hazards" has been 
focused, over the year 1987, on the following three research ac-
tivities: 
Industrial Safety and Reliability Assessment (Risk Analysis), 
Management of Industrial  Risk,  and 
Experiments and Theoretical Studies on Runaway Reactions. 
These activities complement the shared-cost multiannual pro-
gramme in th field of Major Technological Hazards and support 
the regulatory actions of DG XI within the frame of the EC direc-
tive on "Major Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities". 
Moreover, JRC is exploring the possibility to start a new activity 
on emergency planning for industrial hazards, on which a con-
ference in collaboration with DG XI  has been held in november 
1987 at Varese. 
The results obtained during the 1987 period can be summaris-
ed  as fellows. 
Safety and  Reliability Assessment 
The  Benchmark Exercise on  Major Hazard Analysis (BE-MHA) 
project, which aims to compare risk studies independently per-
formed by different expert teams on a same reference subject, 
has been finalised. The BE-MHA aims at establishing a state-of-
the-art review on procedures, methods, models and data bases 
for risk analysis of chemical facilities; at assessing correspon-
ding uncertainties and limitations; at contributing towards com-
mon approaches for risk analysis. The  reference subject is an 
ammonia  storage  facility  with  undersea  and  underground 
pipelines connecting it to a sea terminal and to in-plant storage 
facilities respectively. 
The project is partially funded by the shared-cost multiannual ac-
tion programme on Major Technological Hazards, by DG XI (En-
vironment Consumer Protection & Nuclear Safety) and by JRC. 
The latter is ensuring the coordination of the project and will per-
form the evaluation of the  results (expected by mid  1989). 
13 European  teams are  involved  in  the  project,  represP-nting 
about 20 organisations from 1  0 European countries and belonging 
to  industry,  governmental  bodies,  research  institutes  and 
specialised consultant groups. 
The MARS (Major Accident Reporting System) accident data base 
is now fully operational in agreement with DG XI  and within the 
frame of the post Seveso directive. The accident notified by the 
Member States have been  recorded and their analysis started 
in order to install a correct feedback from experience events for 
contributing to an  effective prevention policy. 
Whereas  industrial  and  research  bodies  such  as  SNAM  (I), 
ENICHEM (I), and GRS (FRG) showed interest on the informatic 
tools already developed by JRC for reliability analysis (e.g. SALP-
PC), significant progress has been achieved towards the develop-
ment of the expert system STARS (Software Tool for Advanced 
Reliability and Safety analysis) in  collaboration with RIS¢ (DK) 
and of tools based on  the DYLAM (Dynamic  Logic Analytical 
Methodology) approach for incident scenario evaluation. 
Promotion of collaborative actions on reliability and incident data 
has been pursued: the support given to associations like ESR-
RDA, ESRA and EuReDatA contributes to link JRC activities with 
general needs. 
Management of  Industrial  Risk 
The activity «Risk Management» has been mainly focused on the 
use and development of the IRIMS system. The main elements 
of the IRIMS system are a menu-driven, mouse-actuated user 
interface which provides easy access to the system; an  infor-
mation system which contains knowledge and data bases,  in-
ference machine and data base management systems; and a 
set of simulation models. Output is primarily in graphical form, 
making  use of high-resolution colour graphics. 
At the beginning of 1987 a demonstration prototype of the I  Rl MS 
system was operating at lspra and had been upgraded, primari-
ly by adding  interconnections between modules. 
A stand-alone transportation risk system, HELP, was developed, 
based on transporting the HASTM transportation risk model and 
the DIDASS-based optimisation module from the SUN machine 
to an  IBM  PC AT.  The  HELP transportation module, describes 
the  road  network in  terms of a graph with arcs and  nodes. 
In  collaboration  with  the  Dutch  Ministry  responsible  for  en-
vironmental affairs, the integrated lspra Risk Management Sup-
port (IRIMS)  software  system  is  being  developed  to produce 
comparative risk scenarios for the production, transport and use 
of cholorine in the Netherlands. The system is now including a 
3-dimensional model allowing risk analysis for heavy gas diffu-
sion and  crisis management. 
Protection  against  Runaway  Reactions 
This  research activity is focused on  two topics: 
- chemical  process  dynamics  in  runaway  conditions 
(characteristics of chemical processes and validation of ex-
isting and possible development of suitable models) and 
- the behaviour of twophase/twocomponent fluid flow in ducts, 
vessels,  vessel/duct,  as well  as back pressure effects and 
discharge  characteristics  of venting  systems  (with  safety 
pressure relief devices). 
Within the frame of the JRC research activities on the chemical 
and thermodynamic behaviour of runaway  reactions, the con-
struction  of  the  experimental  facility  FIRES  (Facility  for  In-
vestigating Runaway Events Safely) has been started. The facility 
is mostly intended to validate specific numerical codes for con-
trol of industrial chemical processes (polymerisation, nitration, 
... ) and to assess the application of "early warning  systems". 
FIRES consists mainly of a standard chemical reactor (1 00 I, 16 
bar) housed in a bunker, of control and data acquisition systems 
and  of  auxiliary  equipment.  Bunker  basement,  chemical 
laboratory and control room have been realised, while reactor 
and auxiliary equipments are  ready for installation. 
5 Complementary  research  in  the  field  of  multiphase-
multicomponent (MPMC) fluid flow has been performed by means 
of  the  improved  small  scale  MPMC-facility,  including 
phenomological  properties  on  two-phase  fluid  flow  regimes; 
depressurisation tests and parametric studies to assess the ap-
plication of the SAFIRE code on predicting flow behaviour in ven-
ting systems. 
Collaboration with the DIERS  (Design  Institute for Emergency 
Relief Systems) users group has been continued and the analysis 
the DIERS'  SAFIRE  code improved. 
JRC activities on runaway reactions are discussed and review-
ed by the European Contact Group on Runaway Reactions which 
includes industrial partners (Rhone Poulenc and Roussel UCLAF 
/F/,  Hoechst /D/,  ICI  /UK/,  DSM  /NU) and  governmental  and 
research institutions University College Dublin IIRU, TNO /NU, 
ENEA-DISP and University of Pisa /1/,  HSE  and Polytechnic of 
the South  Bank,  London /UK/)). 
Explorative studies on  Emergency  Planning 
JRC in collaboration with DG XI  has organised a "European Con-
6 
terence on Emergency Planning for Industrial Hazards", which 
was held in Varese, on 4-5 November 1987. The conference was 
attended by some 200 people from  18 countries. 
Papers were presented in six sessions on the following themes: 
- organisations implementing emergency planning; 
in  and  off site emergency planning design; 
- exercises and auditing  of emergency plans; 
lessons learnt from emergency management for major ac-
cidents; 
information to the public prior to and during an emergency. 
This conference demonstrated a world-wide interest in emergen-
cy planning and in spite of significant agreement as to the general 
approach, differences still exist in  practice due to differing na-
tional structures. The exchange of information and experience 
suggested  the  opportunity  of establishing  general  guidelines 
developed from emergency plans of organisation"s in technical-
ly advanced countries to be used as model for the less technically 
developed ones. The conference proceedings will be published 
by  Elsevier  Applied  Sciences  Publishers  (UK)  and  should  be 
available in  mid-1988. RESEARCH  ACTIVITIES 
1.  Safety and  Reliability Assessment 
Public awareness of the  risks associated with processing and 
storage of dangerous substances has been intensified by severe 
accidents having recently occurred everywhere in the world. As 
a result,  regulatory bodies are  requiring for those installations 
with the highest hazard potential, rigorous safety case submis-
sions including to an ever increasing extent some quantification 
of the risks  involved in  normal and abnormal operation. 
As  far as  safety analysis is  concerned,  in  recent years many 
techniques  have  been  developed  for  structuring  the  overall 
assessment procedures into different steps aimed at: 
- hazard identification; 
- systems logical  modelling; 
- reliability estimations; 
- evaluation of frequency and consequences of significant ac-
cidents. 
Limitations of these techniques do still exist both in  modelling 
(especially low probability- large consequence events, because 
of intrinsic large uncertainties involved, complex interactions of 
technical  systems  with  human  operators,  identification  of 
dependency structures, process modelling, consequence calcula-
tions,  etc.); and  in  practicability (detailed analyses still  require 
heavy manual efforts that can strongly be reduced by improv-
ing  computerized  aids,  introduction  of  advanced  informatic 
technologies is  still  in  a very preliminary phase). 
Moreover, the reporting of abnormal events is being more and 
more recognized as an essential feedback channel for controll-
ing  and  improving safety of industrial  installations. 
To this aim, the Council Directive on Major Accident Hazard of 
Certain  Industrial  Activities  No.  82/501/EEC  requires  that the 
Member States inform the Commission about major accidents 
occurring in  their countries. The  Directive asks also the Com-
mission to implement a  register containing a summary of the 
major accidents which have occurred, including an analysis of 
the causes of such accidents, experience gained and measures 
taken, to enable the Member States to use this information for 
preventive purposes. 
Objectives 
Based on the described background, the main objectives of the 
JRC R&D  activities for industrial systems safety and  reliability 
assessment can  be  expressed as  follows: 
a.  to contribute to the establishment of a common awareness 
in Europe about advantages, limitations und uncertainties of 
available models, data and procedures for safety and reliability 
assessment of hazardous installations; and to the elabora-
tion of common procedures; 
b.  to  contribute  to  the  development  and  improvement  of 
methodologies for safety and reliability assessment; and to 
facilitate  their  applications  by  industry,  authorities  and 
research organisations by implementing them in user-friendly 
computerised tools; 
c.  to give the Commission (DG XI) the necessary technical sup-
port in the fulfillment of the specific duty established by the 
Directive through design and implementation of the Major Ac-
cident Reporting  System (MARS). 
Results  of  research  activities 
The JRC R&D objectives are being pursued by the activities which 
are outlined in  the following,  while the principal achievements 
and the major projects are more detailedly described in par. 1.1 
through 1  .5. The R&D activities can be grouped according to the 
assumed objectives, and  namely: 
Ref.  objective: a. 
Harmonisation of procedures and cross fertilisation among dif-
ferent  industrial sectors is  being  pursued on  the one hand by 
the launching of the major European collaborative project "Ben-
mark Exercise on Major Hazard Analysis" (see par. 1.1 ), and on 
the other hand by participating, promoting and supporting work-
ing  groups and  associations active  in  Europea on  safety and 
reliability R&D efforts. Because of the relevance of the problems 
connected with safe operation and plant adequate maintenance, 
significant collaborations have been established with the Human 
Factor Working Party of the European Federation of Chemical 
Engineering, and with national laboratories such as RIS¢ in DK 
and CNR  in  Italy,  for common  research  in  the field of human 
factors. A significant support is being given to European associa-
tions  like  ESRA (European  Safety and  Reliability Association), 
EuReDatA (European Reliability Data Bank Association) and ESR-
RDA (European Safety and Reliability Research and Development 
Association).  ESRA aims at constituting a communication net-
works between national associations, researchers, training and 
education bodies,  industrial and  governmental users of safety 
and  reliability technology. The JRC  support to ESRA  is  essen-
tially directed towards its educational programme /1 ,2/ and to 
the publication of the Newsletter /3/.  EuReDatA /4/ is aimed at 
accelerating the process of harmonisation of safety and reliability 
data collection procedures through project groups, seminars /5,6/ 
and courses /7/.  As  EuReDatA is active in the data field,  ESR-
RDA has been recently created to harmonise R&D actions and 
results,  and to promote the application of safety and reliability 
techniques in industries and decision making bodies. The duties 
of the General Secretary both of ESRRDA and  EuReDatA are 
assured  by  the  JRC  which,  therefore,  finds  well  established 
discussion forums for linking its activities with possible multiple 
users. 
Ref.  objective: b. 
Models and informatic tools are being developed and released 
to external users both for systems reliability analysis and for con-
sequence analysis. In particular the user-friendly fault-tree code 
SALP-PC  has  been  released  (see  par.  1.2),  knowledge-based 
reliability analysis tools (see par. 1.3) are at a rather advanced 
state of development in  collaboration with other research cen-
tres (RIS¢ is  already involved, whereas with other institutions 
collaboration agreements are being discussed), and the MARA 
code for heavy gas dispersion has been developed and validated 
with experimental  results (see  par.  1  .4). 
In addition to the above achievements after exploratory studies 
for application of the DYLAM technique /8/ to process plant safety 
and  reliability analysis /9/,  a project has started for producing 
7 an integrated software package for analysis of accident scenarios 
including domino effects. Results from this project are to be ex-
pected by the end of 1988.  /1 0/ 
Ref.  objective: c. 
The MARS data bank has been made operational, the accidents 
reported have been  stored and the analysis work has  started 
(see par.  1  .5). 
Results of topical research  activities: 
1.1  BENCHMARK EXERCISE ON  MAJOR HAZARD 
ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
The  interest  in  probabilistic  methods for safety and  reliability 
analysis has grown considerably in Europe over the past decade. 
This  is  due to the  fact that  such  methods  appear to offer a 
systematic framework for analysis of highly complex plants or 
systems in  different decisional processes. 
At  system  design  level,  probabilistic  techniques  are  used 
everywhere for  improving safety in  a cost-effective way,  and 
choosing among technical alternatives, often linking  reliability, 
availability and maintainability issues in an integrated approach 
. (RAM  programmes). 
At the political level,  risk studies are being promoted as a sup-
port to decisions concerning strategies (e.g. comparison of risks 
connected with  diverse technological  systems),  and  they are 
entering in public debates on the acceptability of hazardous plants 
(Public  Inquiries). 
Licensing or control authorities are confronted with the problem 
of examining the safety cases for the major hazard installations, 
which might include probabilistic assessments.  In  some coun-
tries such as the Netherlands, acceptance of new plants is be-
ing based on risk figures; some other authorities are encouraging 
the use of probabilistic methods as a useful piece of informa-
tion in addition to hazard identification techniques. For instance, 
in  the  U.K.,  the  Health  and  Safety  Executive  suggests  in  its 
guidance on the contents of "Safety Cases" that: "While it may 
be possible for manufacturers to write a safety case in qualitative 
terms, H&SE may find it easier to accept conclusions which are 
supported by quantitative arguments." 
A quantitative assessment is also a convenient way of limiting 
the scope of the Safety Case by demonstrating either that an 
adverse event has a very remote possibility of occurring, or that 
a particular consequence is  relatively minor. 
Despite  its  increasing  use  it is generally recognized  that pro-
babilistic safety analysis (PSA) is still in a developing phase, of-
fering  to  the  decision  makers  a  variety  of  approaches  and 
methodologies,  under  sometimes  different  technologies,  and 
presenting  the  results  under forms which are  very difficult to 
compare. 
Whichever  the  decisional  process  should  be,  consistency of 
methods and procedures is  a prerequisite indispensable for a 
correct use  of the  approach  and  its  results.  At  this  aim  it  is 
necessary to understand clearly: 
- the advantages and limitations of the available methodologies; 
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- the uncertainties linked with the use of the methodologies and 
the origin of these uncertainties; 
- the comparability of different analyses; 
- the maturity of the models used or the lack of knowledge in 
certain areas; 
- the cost and benefit of the different approaches; 
- the tuning of analysis procedures to the various scopes of the 
analysis. 
Since  the  above-mentioned  problems  have  not  yet  been 
systematically analysed,  it appears, on  the one hand, that dif-
ferent studies already published are not easily comparable, and, 
on the other, that all debates on ucertainties and usefulness of 
probabilistic methods are not yet based on  factual elements. 
As a contribution to clarify the problems connected with the use 
of PSA  techniques,  benchmark exercises  have  proved  to be 
highly successful in  the nuclear field.  Indeed, the independent 
analysis of a reference object by different participating teams 
from industry, research institutes and authorities, has proven to 
be an  effective tool to have an  understanding of the available 
methods, their strength and their weaknesses, the uncertainties 
involved,  their origin  and  their impact on  the  results. 
Furthermore, benchmark exercises helped to arrive at a com-
mon language and a better dialogue between the various involv-
ed. It has been shown that even in the case of techniques which 
a priori were believed to be well established (such as the fault 
tree  technique  for  reliability  analysis),  some  very  interesting 
lessons could be  learnt /11-14/. 
The increasing use of,  interest in or at least movement around 
application of PSA in the chemical process industries, together 
with the positive experience with the benchmark exercise in the 
nuclear field, as well as some similar studies on petrochemical 
installations /15/,  have raised a demand for organising a similar 
exercise for the chemical field. This demand originated from the 
ESRA in which delegates from industry, research institutes and 
authorities of the different member countries expressed their in-
terest in  the performance of similar exercises. 
The feasibility of a European project on major hazard analysis 
has been assessed in  a preliminary workshop which was held 
at lspra on 28 October 1985, which resulted in the mandate to 
JRC 
- to assess the availability of some adequate reference plants 
for the study; 
- to provide some rather detailed proposals with indication of 
objectives, terms of reference and preliminary planning of the 
envisaged project; and 
- to explore the possibility of some financial support through the 
cost-shared action programme. 
The  actions  undertaken  by JRC,  through  contacts with  plant 
owners,  industrial  organisations,  experts and authorities,  con-
tributed to the establishment of a proposal on which a wide con-
sensus could be expected. Based on this proposal a project was 
set up as agreed and decided in the launching meeting on 17-18 
June at  lspra. 
The entire Benchmark Exercise should be concluded within 20 
months by the issue of a final  report. 
Objectives 
Guiding objectives are: 
- to identify the state of the art in  analysing  major hazards; 
- to obtain estimates of the overall degree of uncertainty in risk 
analysis. which  include: 
- comparison of different methods,  models and  procedures; 
- assessment of relative advantages and limitations according 
to some measures to be elaborated; 
- state of available data bases; 
- assessment of the variability of the results obtained by indepen-
dent teams,  and  origin and  nature of the uncertainties; 
- identification of problem areas, possibly worth of separate in-
vestigations; 
- possible achievement of a common awareness on the pro-
blems connected with all  items mentioned above. 
The study will not be limited as far as events to be included in 
the analysis are concerned. Significant attention will  be  given 
to the qualitative procedures for hazard identification, preliminarly 
to any quantitative assessment.  It will then  include estimation 
of frequencies and consequences of possible relevant incidents, 
and  will  be  concluded by the  determination  of  individual  risk 
contours. 
Reference plant 
The  study will  be  performed on  an  ammonia storage facility, 
which  is  located  in  a  hypothetical  site,  on  the  base  of  its 
documentation. The facility includes the following installations: 
- a sea ammonia terminal; 
- an  undersea pipeline to the seaside storage facility; 
- a refrigerated storage tank with  15000 tons of ammonia; 
- underground piping  to the fertiliser plant; 
- in-plant storage tanks. 
Funding  and  participation 
Most of the participating organisations are being partially fund-
ed  by  the  Commission  of the  European  Communities  either 
through the JRC direct research programme, or through DG-XI, 
or finally through the shared-cost action programme on  major 
technological  hazards.  · 
The participating teams represent European countries and are 
formed  by  authorities,  inspection  organisations,  research  in-
stitutes, consultants and engineering companies as well as  in-
dustries. This allows the project to take into account all  points 
of view (see  /161)  and,  therefore,  hopefully to represent a first 
significant step towards a common understanding at European 
level of advantages and limitations of PSA in the process industry. 
The  participating teams are: 
•  Belgium: Vinc;otte - Solvay 
•  Denmark:  RIS¢ 
•  Finland:  VTT-OTSO  Insurance Company- Kemira Oy 
•  Federal  Republic  of  Germany:  Gesellschaft  fOr  Reaktor-
sicherheit m.b.h.  (GRS)  - Battelle Institute e.V. 
•  Greece: NRCNS "Democritos"- University of Athens- Ministry 
of the Environment 
•  Italy:  ENEA  - SNAMPROGETII  (ENI  group)  - NIER  - FIAT 
Engineering (Civil  Protection) 
•  The  Netherlands: TNO 
•  The  Netherlands:  Ministerie van  VROM 
•  United Kingdom:  Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
•  United Kingdom: Technica 
•  Multinational: EDRA (Engineering  Design Research Analysis 
Sre), Italy-CEP (Contr61e et Prevention), France -IGC (lnspec-
cion  y  Garantia  de  Calidad  S.A.),  Spain  - TECHNIMONT 
(Montedison group),  Italy - Rohm  and  Haas,  Italy. 
JRC  is  coordinating  the  project  by  ensuring  the  technical 
secretariat, and will compare the results of the different teams, 
organise the comparative and conclusive meetings, and edit the 
final  rgport on  the project. 
1.2  SALP·PC, A COMPUTER PACKAGE FOR FAULT TREE 
ANALYSIS  ON  PERSONAL COMPUTER 
Main characteristics  of  the  SALP·PC software package 
The fault-tree technique is a very important tool in system reliabili-
ty analysis.  In the past a lot of computer codes for logical and 
probabilistic analysis of fault-trees have been developed on main 
frame computers.  In  the last few years the increasing perfor-
mance of personal computers enabled the development of in-
dependent work stations for risk assessment, dealing not only 
with analysis but also with model synthesis and manipulation. 
In  this line,  the JRC-Ispra has started a project aiming at pro-
ducing an integrated software for fault-tree/event-tree synthesis 
and analysis, STARS (Software Tool for the Analysis of Reliabili-
ty and Safety) /17/. The SALP-PC, which represents one of the 
STARS modules, is an interactive package for fault-tree analysis. 
It has been developed on an IBM compatible personal computer 
and written in FORTRAN-77 to guarantee the maximum portabili-
ty. The package contains some 14,000 executable statements. 
In  the present version the data structure is  defined  in  such a 
way to allow the analysis  of fault-trees containing  up to 200 
primary events and  200  operators;  the  maximum  number of 
minimal cut-sets (MCSs) is set equal to 4000 (order 10 max). The 
RAM  memory requirement  is  less than 400 kb. 
The SALP-PC is composed of six main programmes, implemen-
ting the different phases of the fault-tree analysis procedure. The 
allowed logical operators are AND, OR, NOT, KIN, XOR and INH. 
The "enabler" event of the INH operator can also be a subtree, 
not necessarily independent on the subtree describing the "in-
itiating" event. 
Boundary conditions can also be defined to obtain fault-trees con-
ditioned to the state of one or more components, without hav-
ing  to modify the input fault-tree description. 
It is possible to restart at each step of the analysis, with modified 
input  parameters  without  repeating  the  previous  steps.  The 
possibility to perform an  on-line sensitivity analysis makes the 
package particularly useful for design optimisation. 
The problem of developing efficient procedures for determining 
the minimal cut-sets (MCSs) of a large fault-tree is  rather com-
plex,  since  the  running  time  has  always  to  be  kept  within 
reasonable limits; this problem becomes even more complex on 
personal  computers due to the limited resources available. 
In order to face these problems, the following solutions have been 
adopted: 
- use of cut-off criteria for determining only a subset of the MCSs 
(i.e.  the significant MCSs); 
- a  new  procedure for  determining the  MCSs,  based  on  the 
analysis of the tree at different levels of detail; 
- use of efficient algorithms for cut-set minimisation; 
- use of garbage collection procedures to reduce the probabili-
ty that the programme may abort due to ins.ufficient working 
memory space; 
9 - pruning of the input tree (before determining the MCSs) when 
NOT operators or boundary conditions are present. 
Each of these methodological aspects is briefly presented, while 
a complete description of the SALP-PC package is given in /8/. 
Use of cut-off criteria 
Theoretically,  all  MCSs  should  be  identified,  as  each of them 
could produce the system failure.  However, in practical cases, 
the identification of all  MCSs  can be not only very expensive 
because of the high running time, but also useless. Therefore, 
only significant MCSs  can be  determined. The  significance is 
defined either on a s~ructural basis (order of a MCS) or on a pro-
babilistic basis  (mission  time  unavailability).  If the  aim  of the 
analysis is to obtain the most significant MCSs,  a measure of 
the  approximation  introduced  (truncation  error,  Pe)  must 
necessarily be determined, without actually finding all the MCSs. 
With the use of the probabilistic criterion (a MCS is considered 
to be relevant if its mission time unavailability is not less than 
a pre-established threshold value Pnm). this measure represents 
an estimate of the cumulative unavailability at the mission time 
of not significant MCSs.  If such a measure is  not determined, 
the probabilistic cut-off is of little value. The knowledge of Pe 
is fundamental to judge whether or not the chosen cut-off value 
Plim can be considered as appropriate; consequently, to be really 
useful, the estimate of Pe must be as close as possible to the 
exact value, without determining actually the disregarded MCSs. 
In  order to estimate Pe,  a new method of analysis has been 
developed, based upon the concept of pseudo-module. The ap-
plication of such a method also allows a significant reduction 
of computer time compared with other available methods. 
Logical analysis  methodology 
In order to reduce the computer time, in fault-tree analysis it is 
of paramount importance to perform the modularisation phase, 
whose aim is to transform the input tree into a forest of indepen-
dent  simpler  subtrees;  generally,  the  larger  the  number  of 
substrees, the less computer time is needed. This is why efforts 
have been spent in  the past to set up ways of modularising a 
given tree as  much as possible. 
In  most computer codes the  modularisation  is  performed  by 
determining the so-called simple modules, i.e. subtrees contain-
ing only unreplicated primary events. Some codes determine also 
complex modules, i.e. containing all occurrences of one or more 
replicated primary events.  In  the SALP-PC  approach a strong 
reduction of computer time has been obtained, as well as a very 
good estimate of the truncation error, by defining a new analysis 
method  based  on  the concept of pseudo-module.  A  pseudo-
module (p-module) is defined as a subtree in  which no occur-
rences of repeated  subtrees appear.  It has to be noticed that 
this definition allows replicated primary events to appear also 
outside the pseudo-module. 
Figure  1' shows a fault-tree already modularised with indepen-
dent modules. According to the definition, the p-modules -shown 
by dotted lines - are the subtrees G4,  G1 0,  G12,  G11  and G3. 
When the p-modules are substituted in the main tree with single 
variables, the "Macro Fault-Tree (MFT)" is produced, as shown 
in  Figure 1 by heavy lines. By following this approach the fault-
tree,  modularised  with  independent  modules,  is  therefore 
transformed into the MFT and a forest of simpler but Dependent 
Substrees (DS).  It can easily be realised that this approach always 
leads to a strong reduction of the fault-tree complexity, while this 
cannot be  guaranteed by other methods. 
The presence of DSs necessarily requires the definition of a two-
stage analysis procedure. 
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SMx:  simple  module 
p-module 
SMx:  macro  fault  tree 
D  D 
... _-- .... 
Fig.  1 -Example of pseudo module and macro fault tree 
generation 
In the first stage the MFT and all DSs are independently analys-
ed without making use of any cut-off technique; the set of minimal 
failure combinations of the MFT are here referred to as "Macro 
cut-sets".  In  the  second  stage,  dependencies  among  the 
elements of macro cut-sets are solved. It is at this time that the 
cut-off technique is applied for retaining only the significant MCSs 
and estimating the truncation error value. A similar algorithm is 
applied during the simple module expansion for determining the 
significant MCSs  of the  input tree. 
Out-set  minimisation procedure 
The minimisation procedure plays an important role in fault-tree 
analysis: most of the computer time is spent in minimising cut-
sets. In order to reduce the computer time it is necessary, apart 
from using a powerful minimisation procedure, to minimise only 
potentially non-minimal cuts when this is strictly necessary. in 
SALP-PC an efficient algorithm is applied at each gate level to 
determine whether its descendants are dependent or not; in case 
of dependence, the set of combinations is partitioned and only 
those containing  locally repeated events are minimised. 
Garbage collection  procedure 
A problem that arises when the number of MCSs  is too large 
is that of insufficient working memory space.  In  this case it  is 
useful to apply a garbage collection algorithm to arrange data 
in  some way so as to prevent the programme from aborting. 
During the analysis of the MFT the MCSs of repeated subtrees 
are to be used if necessary. In case of unavailability of working 
memory space, the garbage collection procedure visits the part 
of the tree still to be analysed, identifies the reference to repeated 
subtrees  and  deletes  the  MCSs  of  those  subtrees  no  more 
necessary. 
During  the expansion  of the simple  modules the probabilistic 
threshold value is automatically increased (or the logical value 
decreased when it concerns the qualitative analysis) each time 
the memory space is saturated. Therefore, the new not signifi-
cant MCSs are deleted and their probability added to the trun-
cation error value.  This guarantees, except in  some particular 
cases,  a final  result even on  very complex trees. 
Fault-tree pruning procedures 
The SALP-PC programs allows the user to analyse fault-trees con-
taining the NOT operator. Compared with the analysis of AND-
OR  trees,  AND-OR-NOT fault-trees  pose  many additional  pro-blems and hence the algorithms for determining the minimal form 
of prime implicants are time-consuming. On  the other hand,  a 
fault-tree contains many variables, and negated events are defin-
ed to describe the ''good'' state of components, whose probability 
is  generally either  1 or very close to 1  . 
Examples of such applications are found  in  the description of 
mutually exclusive events and in the event sequence analysis. 
In  SALP-PC,  simplified methods, applicable when these condi-
tions  are  satisfied,  have  been  implemented  giving,  as  a final 
result,  the disjunction of minimal  cut-sets on  which the quan-
titative analysis can be applied /10/. The algorithm is based on 
the a priori elimination of all unreplicated negated events before 
the  modularisation  phase  is  applied.  The  remaining  negated 
events are considered until they are no more needed or logical-
ly  deleting  impossible combinations. 
Conclusions  and  further development 
The modular structure of the SALP-PC code has proved to be 
extremely interesting. This structure allows the programme to 
be easily implemented on various types of computers (from per-
sonal to mainframe). Moreover, the various developed processors 
may be applied for solving other types of problems, thus mak-
ing  it easy to build codes for,  for example, event-tree analysis 
and CCF  analysis. 
The  SALP-PC  code is  fast  in  comparison with other fault-tree 
analysis codes, as confirmed by the experience gained so far. 
A second version of the package is planned for the end of next 
year. Apart from a further reduction in computer time it will be 
possible to analyse phased mission systems and binary systems 
containing multistate compounds. Furthermore, the MAPLE code 
for fault-tree drawing /20/ will  also be  implemented. 
1.3  STARS: A SOFTWARE TOOL  FOR ADVANCED 
RELIABILITY AND  SAFETY ANALYSIS 
Systems safety and reliability analysis consists in  general of: 
- a qualitative hazard analysis in which the events and scenarios 
relevant for the safety and/or reliability are identified and ranked 
on  the basis of their consequences or hazard potential; 
- the  construction  of  logic  system  models  that describe the 
system behaviour with respect to the above-mentionned events 
and scenarios either in a deductive or an  inductive way; and 
- the quantitative analysis of the models constructed with the 
aim to calculate numeric estimates and uncertainty bounds 
for e.g.  system  reliability, occurrence probability of relevant 
events,  etc. 
Various computer codes for quantitative analysis of the  logic 
models are available. Hazard identification and the contruction 
of logic models are still  mainly performed without or with very 
limited computer assistance and both  require. considerable ef-
fort and skill. 
A need for computer assistance in modelling not only arises from 
the effort and cost involved, but also from the wish to reduce 
the analyst to analyst variability and to facilitate the scrutinising 
of the studies produced. These latter factors are becoming more 
and more important as probabilistic approaches are entering in 
the licensing framework /21/.  Indeed, Benchmark Exercises on 
systems analysis /22/ and common cause failure analysis /13/ 
have shown that different assumptions, subjective judgement and 
implicit procedures used in modelling contribute significantly to 
the spread observed in the results and make it difficult to com-
pare different analyses. 
The STARS (Software Tool for the Analysis of Reliability and Safe-
ty) project /17,  23/ aims at developing an integrated set of CAA 
(Computer Aided Analysis) tools for the various tasks involved 
in  systems safety and reliability analysis including hazard iden-
tification, qualitative analysis, logic model construction and quan-
tification. 
The project has developed from earlier experience of JRC in the 
field  of fault-tree  construction  code  like  CAFTS  /24,  25/ and 
analysis codes like SALP-PC /8/.  In  1987, a collaboration was 
started with RIS¢ National Laboratory which also has large ex-
perience in  the subject from  its  RIKKE  code. 
Overall  structure of STARS 
The expert system technology offers the most promising perspec-
tives  for  developing  a CAA tool  for  hazard  identification  and 
modelling. Combined with graphics and analysis capabilities, it 
can  provide  a  natural  engineering-oriented  environment  for 
computer-assisted reliability and safety modelling and analysis. 
The overall structure of the STARS package is shown in  Fig.  2 
and contains the following main modules: 
Plant  description 
module 
Hazard  identification 
module 
Identification  and  ranking 
of  critical  events/sequences 
Model  construction 
module 
fault  tree  modelling 
event  tree  modelling 
state  graph  modelling 
common  cause  failure 
modelling 
Logic  and  Probabilistic 
Analysis  module 
event  tree  analysis 
fault  tree  analysis 
Markov  analysis 
Figure 2- STARS general structure 
- a plant or system description module that will be used to 
build the facts data base containing the relevant information 
(topology, processes, functions ... ) about the system or plant 
under study in accordance with the type of analysis (hazard 
identification,  macro  fault-tree  construction,  refinement  of 
macro fault-tree ... ); 
- a hazard identification module; 
- a system model construction module: for the moment, the 
fault-tree modelling technique is developed but it is the inten-
tion  to  include  event  tree  modelling  and  state  graphs. 
Moreover, the development of common cause failure identifica-
tion and modelling capabilities will  be considered; 
- a quantitative analysis module for performing logic and pro-
babilistic analysis on the system models (fault/event trees, state 
graphs). 
11 The hazard identification and the model construction modules 
make  use  of  three  knowledge  bases:  on  units  (KB1),  on 
substances (KB2) and on  compounds (KB3). 
Qualitative analysis tool 
The qualitative analysis tool will  be used for two purposes: 
- the identification of potential hazards, events and event se-
quences leading to hazards; 
- the  elicitation  of process-specific  knowledge  to be  used  in 
subsequent modelling. 
The approach will be to emulate the reasoning and expertise ap-
plied by analysis in hazard and operability studies into an expert 
system. 
In such studies, the plant is subdivided into systems and/or units 
each having well defined functions. The deviations from these 
normal functions and the way in  which  these  deviations pro-
pagate in  the plant are then analysed. 
The expert system will use three knowledge bases: 
- a plant/unit knowledge base which is structured into layers: 
industry type, process type and unit type. The knowledge base 
will contain characteristics of processes and units such as: 
•  potential deviations of process parameters and/or functions 
and rules  about their possible causes and  effects; 
•  potential  unit malfunctions or failures; 
•  generic critical events or event sequences known to be rele-
vant for certain types of processes or units (possibly in com-
bina_tion  V1fith certain types of substances); 
•  checklists on potentially relevant facts to be prompted to 
the analyst. 
- substance knowledge base structured into 5 layers: organic-
inorganic, functional group, state of matter, flash point toxici-
ty and toxicity of combustion products and  completed with 
knowledge about possible reaction products (simplified reac-
tion matrix);  and 
- a component knowledge base which is  shared with the ex-
pert system for constructing logic models in  the subproject 
of the STARS project concerning hazard identification. The part 
of this knowledge base used here contains rules whether com-
ponent failures or malfunctions can cause specific process 
parameter deviations. 
For identifying relevant events or event sequences, the expert 
system will perform an inductive (event driven) reasoning by the 
following basic points: 
- a first list of potentially relevant deviations/malfunctions is iden-
tified by consulting the unit  layer in  the knowledge base,  in 
which for each unit type a checklist with possible deviations 
is  stored; 
- the list of potentially relevant deviations is completed by con-
sulting the process layer in the knowledge base, in which im-
portant (from the hazard point of view) deviations, particular 
to specific process types,  are stored; 
- the list of potentially relevant deviations is reduced by screening 
according to the possible occurrence of causes for the devia-
tions at the unit or component level: i.e. a deviation in a unit 
is no longer considered if there are no unit/component failures 
or malfunctions that could cause such deviation and there is 
no possibility to propagate the deviation from other units; 
- the reduced list of potential deviations is  further reduced by 
screening according to the consequences of the deviation. The 
substance knowledge base in consulted in this screening, the 
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retained  relevant  events  and  event  sequences  are  more 
precisely identified in terms of underlying system malfunctions 
using  the knowledge at the unit level. 
The result is a list of ranked deviations to be considered for the 
plant under study and possibly to be modelled in detail using fault-
trees or other logic models. To construct these fault-trees, the 
expert system of the STARS model construction module can be 
. used. 
Model  construction  module 
The  fault-tree  construction tool  will  be  largely inspired by the 
previous experience. A frame/rule based expert system will be 
used,  in  which  the deductive (goal  driven)  reasoning  and the 
heuristics, applied during manual fault-tree construction, will be 
modelled. 
The knowledge base used for the fault-tree construction contains 
generic knowledge on components, knowledge specific for the 
system and process analysed as collected during the qualitative 
analysis, and knowledge needed to direct and control the reason-
ing  process ("metarules", e.g.  on  incompatible situations). 
The knowledge  is  represented  in  frames covering component 
characteristics, rules to be used for construction of macro fault-
trees and rules to develop the causes of the component states. 
The  construction will  proceed in  phases (as  in  CAFTS): 
- First a macro fault-tree will be constructed on the basis of the 
topological information of the functional flow diagram or P&l 
D obtained interactively in a plant description module, and of 
the  process  information  obtained  through  the  computer-
assisted qualitative analysis. The construction of the macro 
fault-tree will be triggered by specifying a state or some com-
bination of states at some node(s) in  the system diagram.  It 
will proceed by backward chaining througth rules that describe 
the (local)  relationships between states at input, output and 
internal modes of components and by consulting the meta rules 
that control the process. Occasionally, the user may be prompt-
ed to enter information which is  process-specific and which 
was not yet obtained by the qualitative analysis. As a typical 
example the user might be asked to confirm whether or not 
in  a particular section the pressure-flow conditions are such 
that  a  reversed  flow  could  be  created  under  certain  cir-
cumstances. 
As  a  result,  a  macro fault-tree  containing  component/sub-
system  modes leading to the top event,  is  obtained. 
- Next, the macro fault-tree will be further developed on the basis 
of facts provided interactively by the user for the components 
and the connections of these components with support or ser-
vice subsystems. These facts are fed to meta rules that con-
trol the firing  of the  rules which develop the fine causes of 
some component/subsystem mode. 
The  knowledge base is  organised in  a hierarchical way in  the 
form of a tree. The terminal leaves of the tree correspond to dif-
ferent component types; intermediate nodes correspond to com-
ponent classes. The knowledge is distributed over the tree: this 
means that some knowledge is  stored at the level of classes. 
A terminal  leave  (component type)  inheritates the  knowledge 
stored in the path between itself and the root of the tree. In this 
way it  is possible to avoid information duplication and redundan-
cy, and to increase the maintainability of the knowledge base. 
The same representation is used by the plant description module 
to store the information about a specific system (e.g.  topology). 
In this way, application-specific facts and generic knowledge are 
stored  in  the same  coherent way. 1[1=  I 
L---------------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~====================  tars  level  1 
no  element  to be  delete~ 
Figure 3- STARS  fault-tree editor 
Conclusions 
The objectives and overall structure of the STARS project were 
specific and the choice of the hardware and software support 
was performed. The structure of the knowledge bases and the 
knowledge representation schemata (frames) for the component 
knowledge base were developed. 
The global  concept of the hazard identification module as ex-
plained above was defined in collaboration with RIS¢ and VTT 
(Technical Research Centre of Finland). The concept will be fur-
ther validated and developed as a collaboration between JRC, 
RIS¢ and VTT.  For valdating the approach, typical examples of 
process plants (i.e. sulphuric acid production plant) will be used 
as test cases. 
Concerning the model construction module, a start was made 
to implement a fault-tree construction and editing tool (see Fig. 
3). The editing tool was partly based on a previous fault-tree plot-
ting code /20/. 
From the experience with CAFTS, it became apparent that func-
tional or process related information needs to be considered dur-
ing fault-tree construction alongside with topological information. 
The basic approach to adopt for considering this type of infor-
mation was studied. 
The feasibility of using the RIKKE  knowledge base to feed the 
STARS component knowledge base was investigated by RIS¢. 
1.4  MARA: A HEAVY GAS  DISPERSION  MODEL 
In many safety evaluations, the hazards due to release of liquefied 
substances must be determined and the concentration field of 
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the gas  blanket  as  a  consequent  their  evaporation  must be 
calculated in  time and space. 
Presently,  a  large effort is being made trying to simulate the 
dispersion of gaseous substances heavier than air,  by means 
of ''box-models'', in which the physical variables describing the 
cloud are treated as constant within the cloud iteself. The box 
is spreading on the soil, due to the gravity force and increasing 
its size because of the air mixing. 
The main advantage of using box-models lies in their short com-: 
puting  time,  which  makes  them  particularly  suitable  for  risk 
analysis calculations. 
In the majority of cases, box-models can take into account the 
following phenomena: 
- cloud spreading because of gravity; 
- air entrainment from the cloud top and cloud edge; 
- heat transfer with the ground; 
- cloud advection due to the wind; 
- neutral buoyancy dispersion at great dilutions. 
The treatment of the heat transfer with the ground, however, has 
the effect of increasing the computing time of many models, as 
its  introduction  in  the  cloud  equations  does  not  allow  their 
analytical solution, without improving too much the models per-
formances. In fact, the heat transfer due to the mixing with the 
entrained air is by far the most important term of the overall heat 
balance. 
The  transition to the neutral phase  is  in  general treated  in  a 
discontinuous way, as the large dilutions are not very interesting 
in  case of flammable gases. However, there are other cases, 
13 such as for example when releases of toxic substances occur, 
in  which also this phase is  of great importance. 
Furthermore, the cloud advection is not accurately described in 
many existing box-models, as demonstrated by comparing the 
predictions of the distance travelled after a certain time with the 
results of the release experiments. 
The MARA (Model for Analysis of Releases in the Atmosphere) 
computer code partly avoids these difficulties. 
Code validation 
The capability of the model can  be  shown  by comparing the 
calculated results with some experimental data available in the 
literature. 
The main physical assumptions can be found  at Ref.  /26,  27/: 
substantial improvements in the MARA box model have been ob-
tained by treating the transport of heavy gas clouds in the wind 
direction. 
The Thomey Island trials chosen to validate MARA are those iden-
tified by the numbers 008 and 018. They differ mainly by the at-
mospheric turbulence, and in particular by the windspeed, which 
varies from a low/medium value for the first (2  m/s) to strong 
value (6 m/s) for the second. The atmospheric stability category 
was D in both cases. However, this parameter is considered less 
important for the  results  comparison as it influences only the 
passive phase. 
Figures 4a and 4b show the cloud peak concentration versus 
distance,  both  observed  and  calculated  for  the  investigated 
releases. The agreement can be considered satisfactory, taking 
into account the fact that the experimental points have been 
determined from visual estimation of the cloud concentration up-
per limit, which was measured by detectors at the same radial 
distance from the  release point. 
Figure 5 shows the time dependence of the average cloud con-
centration, both measured and calculated for trial 008. It should 
again be pointed out that it is difficult to determine the average 
measured concentration, as the cloud is not in reality as uniform 
as  the theoretical approach would suggest. 
In  Figure 6 the  measured and calculated -time  dependence of 
the cloud radius is shown for trial 008.  It is possible to observe 
that the gas radius square root (or linear increase of the gas area) 
with time is  respeced. 
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In Figure 7 the distance travelled by the cloud centre is reported 
versus time. The good agreement between the experimental data 
and MARA results is noticeable, particularly if we take into ac-
count the fact that the cloud advection has always been a crucial 
point for the simulation of this kind. 
Once having observed that the general description of the cloud 
increases, and deformation and advection agree with experimen-
tal  results, it is possible to continue in  details and examine the cr: 
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comparison is made, is fair, in the sense that in some of the points 
the agreement is pretty good and in other cases the computed 
values are different from the measured ones, either for the peak 
concentration or for its time-integral value. 
In any case, examining the figures it is possible to conclude that 
the dispersion process is correctly simulated by the model for 
the purpose of safety studies. 
1.5  MARS: THE MAJOR ACCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM 
Great importance is  assigned by the European Council  Direc-
tive to the reporting of major accidents occurring in certa1n  in-
dustrial  activities  (82/501 /EEC  - commonly  referred  to  as 
post-Seveso  Directive).  Accident  notification  is,  indeed,  con-
sidered to be a significant measure for an effective information 
policy among member states, aimed at preventing repetition of 
events sharing  similar patterns of causes. 
Member states shall inform the Commission qS soon as possi-
ble of major accidents which have occurred within their territory, 
15 and shall provide it with information specified in an annex to the 
Directive including  items such as: 
- the circumstances of the accident; 
- the dangerous substance involved; 
- the effects on  man and the environment; 
- the emergency measures taken; 
- the steps envisaged to alleviate the medium and long-term ef-
fects of the accident; and 
- the measures taken to prevent any recurrence of such an ac-
cident. 
''The Commission shall set up and keep at the dis~osal of the 
member states a  register containing a summary of the major 
accidents which have occurred within the territory of the member 
states,  including an  analysis of causes of such accidents, ex-
perience gained and measures taken,  to enable the member 
states to use this information for prevention purposes." 
To comply with the implementation of these articles, the Direc-
torate General XI,  responsible for the environmental policy of the 
Commission, asked JRC to design and implement a data bank 
for storing the information supplied by the  member states. 
Development of  MARS 
MARS  has been developed according to the following  steps: 
a.  promotion of a state-of-the-art review on existing incident data 
bases; 
b.  drafting of a  reference  classification  scheme  for  process 
plants; 
c.  finalisation of the accident reporting collection forms; 
d.  design and  implementation of the informatic structure. 
Step a 
The objective of the survey was to determine the state of the 
art of industrial accident data bases within the European Com-
munity and the  United States of America.  The  results  of the 
survey summarised at ref. /28/ and more extensively in the EUR 
report at ref. /29/, were, on the one hand, helpful for the design 
of MARS,  and on the other hand, enlightening the need for an 
accident data base designed for the main purpose of safety in-
vestigations. It resulted, indeed, that the majority of incident repor-
ting systems were focused on  injuries and fatalities, whereas 
information on the cause of the incident, including technical in-
formation on the various phenomena associated with the inci-
dent,  is  rather scarce. 
Step b 
A comprehensive classification scheme for process plants has 
been  developed  as  a  proposal  for  a  multi-level  taxonomy of 
industry-type, plant-generic identification, system function and 
process units /30/.  The work was aimed, on the one hand,  at 
the univoquous identification of plants and systems involved in 
accidents by assignment of appropriated codes in  MARS, and, 
on the other hand, it was more in general aimed at the establish-
ment of some standards  for  collecting  performance data on 
significant components; data which might be useful in  reliabili-
ty,  availability and maintainability studies as well. 
Fig 12 shows the main criteria on which the classification scheme 
has been based. The first level of the classification (industry type) 
has been already introduced into the MARS  collection forms; 
whereas the other levels might be used in labelling by keywords 
the relevant fields of the collection forms in view of an informa-
tion retrieval based on involved systems, as well as on other rele-
vant keywords such as causes, casualties, etc. 
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Conceptual  des1gn  of  the  four  levels  branchmg  structure 
Fig.  12- Basic criteria for plant classification 
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Before freezing the proposal and extending the scheme to cover 
all types of hazardous installations, the basic criteria are being 
reviewed with national competent bodies to achieve a general 
consensus aimed at uniformising accident reporting. 
Step c 
The information to be supplied in  case of a major accident ac-
cording to the Directive has been specified into detailed acci-
dent collection forms /31/ which should ensure a more uniform 
reporting from the different authorities. The proposed collection 
forms  have been  adopted by the competent authorities after 
some pilot exercises to check their adequacy for the purposes 
of the Directive. They also found a substantial consensus in the 
technical community and proved to be a useful tool for the ac-
cident notification. Furthermore, the reliabiltiy of the sources of 
information makes MARS different from other existing data bases. 
Indeed,  because of the  controlled  quality of the data,  MARS 
becomes a very useful tool for obtaining deeper insight into ac-
cident sequences, useful for implementing a prevention policy. 
Indeed: 
- the  information  about substances and  the  related  involved 
quantities can give an  important feedback to control the list 
of  dangerous  substances  (and  their  minimum  threshold) 
presently covered by the post-Seveso Directive; 
- the knoledge of the masses released, even if subject to a cer-
tain degree of uncertainty, can be useful for identifying source 
term patterns; 
- the mapping of areas affected by accidents can be used for 
testing consequence predictive models; 
- the information on the emergency measures taken and their 
adequacy results in a useful data base for emergency planning; 
- the identification of accident causes is the fundamental step 
for any prevention activity. To this aim, the primary causes 
of the accident can be derived both from the case history 
description and from other specific items, thus allowing the 
analyst to check the consistency of the different descriptions 
in  order to achieve reliable  indications; 
- the description of the measures taken to prevent the recur-
rence of similar accidents may represent a significant base 
for setting up specific and general  recommendations for an 
effective loss prevention policy; and,  finally, 
- the  analysis of the accident  reports  can help  in  identifying 
possible lack of knowledge or weaknesses on current prac-
tices of safety assessment, completeness of check lists, ade-
quacy of existing standards, etc. 
Even if the collection forms have been specifically designed for 
the accidents which must be officially notified to the Commis-sion, it might be of general interest to take these formats as the 
basis for harmonising the way in which accident histories might 
be described. In this way, information on accidents might easily 
be  exchanged  between  organisations  wishing  to  learn  from 
operational experience. 
Step d 
MARS has been implemented by using the ADABAS data base 
system  available  at  JRC  on  the  Amdahl  470  main  frame 
computer. 
The main procedures for data entry and inquiry have been design-
ed in such a way as to make the use of MARS user-friendly. In 
practice, in the data entry mode, the description of the accident 
follows rigorously the collection forms (Fig. 13). Some functional 
keys allow the  user to jump from one section to another. 
H.A.R.S.  - MAJOR  ACCIDENT  REPORT  SYSTEM 
0.  ACCIDENT  - REPORT  - AUTHORITY  A.  UPDATES  HISTORY 
1.  GENERAL  DATA  B.  BIBLIOGRAPKY 
2.  ACCIDENT  TYPE  C.  KEYWORDS  USED  IN  REPORTS 
3.  CIRCUMSTANCES  OF  THE  ACCIDENT  D.  nELETE  ACCIDENT 
4.  EMERGENCY  MEASURES  TAKEN 
5.  ANALYSIS  OF  CAUSES 
6.  NATURE  AND  EXTENT  OF  DAMAGE 
7.  HEDIUH  AND  LONGTER.'I  MEASURES 
ACCIDENT  nullber  (me*ber  atate,  :rear,  pro11:r.  nullb.) 
REPORT  NUMBER  , ,  (PREVIOUS  REPORT  ) 
FUNCTION  (PREVIOUS  DATE  00/00/00  ) 
HRMlMENU---- pf5 ---- pt9 -----------------------------------------------
EXIT  HELP 
Fig.  13- Entry Menu to  MARS 
One report is kept for each accident. In the case that a report 
needs to be updated, each new information is associated with 
the date and a progressive identification number. 
Some of the information describing an accident (i.e. name of the 
substances listed in Annex Ill of the Directive, corresponding CAS 
or EEC codes, type of accident, etc.) is already available in the 
data base and accessible by means of alphanumerical codes. 
A  set  of keywords  can  be  associated with  each  report.  This 
results in  a very effective and complete way of data retrieval. 
The codified information and the keywords are used only during 
the data entry and, therefore, they are not included into the col-
lection forms that have been  held  as simple as possible. 
rhe inquiry mode, which is also menu-driven, is  performed by 
keywords selected from the set of pre-established keywords. 
It is possible, for a selected set of accident reports, to have either 
a complete or an  abbreviated printout. 
In addition to that it has been found very useful to have a sum-
mary of the content of the data base. This consists of updated 
histograms and/or tables containing: 
- total  number of accidents vs year; 
- accidents in  a certain activity field vs year; 
- accidents involving given substances; 
- accidents of a given type (explosion,  fire,  release,  etc.); 
- fatalities; 
- etc. 
Status and  future  developments 
MARS is already fully operational and has been loaded with all 
the accidents notified up to now to the Commission.  Analysis 
of the accidents has started. At the moment, access to MARS 
information is only allowed to the competent authorities. JRC is, 
however, preparing a statistical  review of accident types and 
causes which, without violating the confidentiality requirements, 
might have a wider distribution. 
JRC is also studying the implementation of MARS on a worksta-
tion provided with graphical facilities so that the recorded acci-
dent  histories  might  be  completed  with  site  maps,  damage 
contours,  digitalized  photos  and  other  graphic  facilities  to 
enhance further the quality and completeness of the information. 
Conclusions 
The Benchmark Exercise on Major Hazard Analysis has started: 
its results are expected to give a significant contribution towards 
the establishment of a comprehensive state-of-the-art in Europe 
as far as procedures, models and data for risk analysis are con-
cerned and the connected uncertainties. 
Significant achievements have been realised as far as systems 
reliability analysis (SALP-PC) tools are concerned and a project 
for a more comprehensive knowledge-based software package 
for plant reliability and safety analysis (STARS) is in a rather ad-
vanced execution phase. 
The  dispersion  process  can  be  for  safety  studies  correctly 
simulated· by the model  MARA. 
The implementation of the Major Accident Reporting System and 
the analysis of the  recorded accidents are expected to install 
a correct feedback from experienced events for contributing to 
an  effective prevention policy. 
Promotion of collaborative actions on reliability and incident data 
has been pursued: the support given to associations like ESR-
RDA,  ESRA and EuReDatA contributes to link JRC activities with 
general needs. 
New  methodologies  for  process  plant  safety  and  reliability 
analysis (DYLAM) have been in the frame of exploratory studies 
succesfully demonstrated. 
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19 RESEARCH  ACTIVITIES 
2.  Management  of  Industrial  Risk 
The increasing size and complexity of potentially hazardous in-
dustrial operations make management and regulation of industrial 
risk more and more necessary for support in decision-making. 
Recent advances in computer hafdware and software capabilities 
have major implications for decision support systems. They make 
possible comprehensive systems which can integrate a set of 
simulation models with relevant data bases so that all aspects 
of a problem can be analysed and policy alternatives  rapidly 
assessed.  Further,  interfaces can be designed to permit non-
specialists easy access to methods of analysis and information 
management which were traditionally open only to computer ex-
perts: decision support tools now can be used closer to the ac-
tual point of decision. 
The major medium term goal of this activity was to develop a 
computer-based,  integrated risk management support system, 
applied to the risks of hazardous substances and suitable for use 
by people without specialised computer knowledge or training. 
This  system is called !RIMS,  the lspra Risk  Management Sup-
party System, and is based on the integration of existing simula-
tion  models  and  computer-assisted  procedures  so  that  risk 
managers can consider the relationships amongst the risks of 
production, environmental dispersion, product use, transport risk, 
and waste treatment and disposal. 
The  main  elements of the  IRIMS system  are  a  menu-driven, 
mouse-actuated user interface which provides easy access to 
the system;  an  information system which contains knowledge 
and data bases, inference machine and data base management 
~ystems; and a set of simulation models. Output is primarily in 
graphical form,  making use of high-resolution colour graphics. 
At the beginning of 1987 a demonstration prototype of the I  RIMS 
system was operating at lspra and had been upgraded, primari-
ly by adding  interconnections between modules. 
A formal collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Plan-
ning and Environment (VROM) had been established for adap-
ting  the  IRIMS  shell  tq  the  specific  case  of  chlorine  risk 
management in  the Netherlands.  !RIMS had been modified to 
allow zooming in on detailed maps of the Netherlands to facilitate 
siting  risk studies. 
Objectives 
There were for 1987 two main and some additional objectives 
for this  period: 
- continue of the collaboration with the Dutch Government on 
the chlorine case study, transporting all the relevant software 
to lspra and making  it  operational here. 
- continue of the work on  the consolidation of the !RIMS pro-
totype  system,  specifically  making  improvements  in  the 
transportation  risk module and in  the data bases. 
- in addition, it was planned to explore the feasibility of transpor-
ting some of the IRIMS (SUN-based software) to a personal 
computer, to continue theoretical studies of risk management 
and regulation and to demonstrate the I  RIMS system to other 
potential  users. 
Activities for the coming years will  include: 
- the continuation of chlorine  risk  study; 
- further development of the PC-based decision support system 
for transportation  risk  HELP; 
- further development of the method for digitising maps and 
road  networks; 
implementatior) of the new transportation risk model TRIM, 
which  keeps  accident  probability  and  consequences 
separated,  on  the  SUN;  and, 
- work will begin on the conceptual design of "micro-tRIMS" 
systems,  customised  for  specific  problems,  incl,uding 
emergency planning and management, while a workshop of 
potential micro-IRIMS users will be convened to elicit user 
needs  as  a  starting  point  for  specification  of  design 
parameters. 
Results of the  research  activities 
The  software  and  data  bases  developed  by  VROM  in  the 
framework of the chlorine study were delivered to lspra and made 
operational  here.  This  software  will  be  continually  updated, 
especially  as  digitisation  of  the  Netherlands  maps continues . 
(about one-third completed now) and the railway network is added 
to the transportation data base. 
A stand-alone transportation risk system, HELP, was developed, 
based on transporting the HASTM transportation risk model and 
the DIDAS&based optimisation module from the SUN machine 
to an  IBM PC AT.  DIDASS is a decision support model, based 
on the reference point approach, which finds a satisfactory solu-
tion through an interactive process with the user. This approach 
does not require that the user choose an alternative that is op-
timal in some "objective" sense, but allows him to select an op-
tion  in  accordance with  his own subjective values. 
The HELP transportation module, based on the HA:::>TM transpor-
tation risk model, describes the road network in terms of a graph 
with arcs and nodes. The nodes represent the most important 
settlements and the arcs segments of the roads connecting set-
tlements. Each arc is characterised by its length and one of four 
possible road types.  Route generation between point of origin 
and destination of the shipment is based on the heuristic assump-
tion that ''shorter is better'', and a branch and bounds techni-
que  used.  The  risks  and  cost  of  each  alternative  are  then 
calculated, the costs based on a simple, linear function and the 
risks based on  statistics on  hazardous material transportation 
in terms of injuries, deaths and property damage for each types 
of route,  assuming a log-normal distribution for the estimation 
of consequences. A data base was created for the Italian region 
of Lombardy and a case study of transportation risk carried out 
using HELP.  (see for more details the topical report  "Systems 
for Decision Support:  tRIMS  and  HELP", par.  2.1). 
In addition, a more transparent transportation risk model, TRIM, 
has been designed. TRIM estimates risks based on accident ex-
perience  and  keeps  accident  probability  and  consequence 
separated. The stochastic influence of wind speed, wind direc-
tion and local topography are assumed to be  negligible since 
TRIM  is  intended to support strategic decision  making. TRIM 
estimates consequences bases on two parameters which can 
be  determined  directly  from  accident  reports  if  the  mass  of 
21 material released, the number of fatalities and the distance from 
the accident site to the fatalities have been recorded. A power 
law is assumed, with consequences proportional to the releas-
ed mass, or energy,  to the power n,  where n depends on  the 
consequence type. 
A personal computer based vision system has been adapted for 
use  in  digitising maps to provide information for geographical 
data bases. The information generated can also be used to create 
screen images to display the results of simulations. The vision 
system is first used to obtain a digitised image of a map of the 
area of interest. The particular information required for data bases 
or displays can then be extracted using the program MKMAP 
(Make  MAP)  which  has  been  developed  especially  for  this 
purpose. 
The program has so far been oriented towards obtaining the in-
formation required for the transport simulation models used in 
tRIMS and HELP.  This information can be broadly divided into 
three types: 
- areas having irregular outlines depicting the shape of a coun-
try or geographical  region, 
- locations and names of cities and towns, 
- networks describing  road or rail  transportation systems. 
The first type of information can be digitised automatically, while 
the second two types require the user to digitise them manually 
from the screen image, working with a mouse. Once digitised, 
the information can be transferred to any other machine on which 
it may be  required. The  methods have been tested and found 
to be quick and reliable for the amounts of information required 
to be digitised up to present. A map of Denmark, including ma-
jor cities and road networks, has been created and transferred 
to the SUN  3 workstation on which the !RIMS system is held. 
Also a map of the Lombardy region, again with major towns and 
road networks, has been created and transferred to an IBM-AT 
personal computer and used in the HELP transportation model 
for Lombardy. 
Programs have also been written to oblain outline maps of Europe 
from the AMDAHL mainframe computer and transfer them to 
the SUN 3 workstation. These maps include coastlines, political 
bounderies, rivers and lakes, and can be obtained for the whole 
of Europe or any individual country. The system has been tested 
by transferring  maps  of Spain  and  Great  Britain  to the  SUN 
workstation. 
In order to explore the possible uses of three dimensional models 
of industrial or urban sites in the context of risk studies, a three 
dimensional modelling program, ICON (Interactive CONstruction), 
has been transferred to the SUN  3 workstation and converted 
to  function  with  the Suncore graphics  system.  This  program 
allows the user to rapidly create a model of a site which can 
then be used either for display purposes or for further analysis 
by simulation programs. The program has been demonstrated 
to several  potentially interested parties and  has  found  an  en-
thusiastk response. 
The I  RIMS system has been demonstrated at a number of trade 
fairs and professional society meetings and also to numerous 
visitors to the JRC. The response has been highly positive and 
discussions are in progress with several government agencies 
and industrial groups about possible collaborations in  adapting 
IRIMS for specific studies. 
Several theoretical studies which examine the context in which 
decision support systems are used and possible applications of 
them  have  been  carried  out  and  published  in  the  scientific 
literature. 
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Conclusions 
We have found a great deal of interest in the !RIMS approach 
from possible external collaborators and the existing collabora-
tion with VROM has confirmed the feasibility of installing specific 
software packages preferred by the user as a module of I  RIMS 
which is managed through the !RIMS interface. The experience 
of creating  the  HELP  PC-based  decision  support  system  for 
transportation risks shows that it is possible to transport modules 
from the I  RIMS system to more widely available computer hard-
ware, and  has  also provided experience in  resolving the soft-
ware  and  hardware  compatibility  problems  that  need  to  be 
overcome. The work on three dimensional modelling has been 
well received, indicating that there are a number of potential ap-
plications of this technique to risk analysis, eg local heavy gas 
diffusion, and to crisis management, eg. training of emergency 
teams. 
Results  of  topical  research  activities: 
2.1  SYSTEMS FOR  DECISION  SUPPORT: 
.  I  RIMS AND  HELP 
Introduction 
Recent advances in computer hardware and software capabilities 
have major implications for decision support systems. First, they 
make possible comprehensive systems which can integrate a 
set of simulation models with a family of relevant data bases 
to treat all elements of a problem and the interactions between 
them. Second, they allow the consequences of policy alternatives 
to be rapidly assessed. Third, they permit non-specialists easy 
access to methods of analysis and information management that 
traditionally have been available only to computer experts, thus 
allowing decision support tools to be used closer to the actual 
point of decision. 
In this report we describe the mathematical background for deci-
sion support systems and the actual software developed. Two 
systems have been developed at the JRC along these lines. First 
the  lspra  Risk  Management  Support  System  (IRIMS),  im-
plemented on a dedicated "super-micro" computer, which treats 
the  risks  of hazardous substances from  "cradle to grave"  is 
described. Secondly, the HELP system, developed on a personal 
computer, will be presented in more details.  HELP is a system 
dedicated  to  the  problem  of  transportation  of  hazardous 
materials. 
Reference  point  approach 
The reference point approach is a well known approach in deci-
sion theory /1/.  Described in words, the decision maker defines 
his point of "departure", and then proceeds to find the solution 
available,  which  will  satisfy most of his preferences.  The  im-
plementation  used  here  is  the  Dynamic  Interactive  Decision 
Analysis and Support System (DIDASS), which finds a satisfac-
tory solution through an interactive process with the user. This 
approach does not require that the- user choose an alternative 
that is optimal in some "objective" sense but, rather, analogous 
to Simon's /2/ notion of bounded rationality,  allows the user to 
select an option in accordance with his own subjective values. 
The  model proceeds in  two stages.  In  the  first,  "exploratory" 
stage, the decision maker uses DIDASS to examine information 
on the range of values for the criteria and the frequency distribu-
tion of alternatives. Then the Pareto set of non-dominated alter-
natives is found. An alternative is called non-dominated, or Pareto 
alternative, when no other alternative has attribute values less than or equal to the alternative in question, provide you wish to 
minimise all the attributes. An alternative xi  is defined as a set 
of real  numbers, one for each attribute: 
Xi =(Xj1.Xj2.X13,···,Xjn)  (1) 
where n denotes the  number of attributes in  your problem. 
For each attribute a preference or goal  Gn  is  defined: 
Gn  =  -1  if the  jth attribute is  maximized 
=  1 if the  jth  attribute is  minimized  (2) 
=  0 if the jth attribute is  ignored 
An  alternative Xj  is then dominating the alternative X;,  if and on-
ly  if 
(3) 
for all  attributes. 
In  words,  the  Pareto  set  contains  the  alternatives where  the 
values of all attributes are not worse than in e.ny other alternative. 
From this we can see that an alternative containing the optimun 
for a given attribute always is a member of the Pareto set.  Due 
to the relative small number of alternatives, the method chosen 
for  identifying the Pareto set  is  purely combinatorial. 
In the second, "search" stage, a particular solution is selected 
on the basis of the users' specification of a theoretical point in 
the criteria space, the "reference point", f. The point is defined 
for each criterion by the users' choices of the preferred value 
within the possible range, normally a hypothetical point. A typical 
choice could be the point defined by the minimum of all the at-
tributes. Based on this point, we then search for a function, which 
expresses the deviation from this point, of all  the alternatives. 
This(function can of course be chosen in different ways, but one 
of the more logical is the Euclidian distance. The distance bet-
ween two alternatives is expressed by introducing the following 
function: 
d (  T, :X)  =  II T-x  II 
d =..J  1: (}i-Xi)2 
(4) 
(5) 
Various scaling factors may be applied if the user feels uncom-
fortable with a value for one or several attributes which is larger 
than  the  reference point  in  the  case where a minimisation  is 
wanted. 
Using  the above equation,  the  model  identifies a real  point  in 
the set of alternatives, the  "efficient point", which  represents 
the solution amongst the possible alternatives which is closest 
to the  reference point,  i.e.,  the  "distance" d,  is  minimised. 
In  the  reference  point  approach,  the  various  alternatives 
generated by the transportation risk model are compared against 
a reference point chosen  by the user.  Mathematically, this  in-
volves calcurating the distance between the reference point and 
each  alternative as  shown  in  equation (5). 
If the numerical values of the attributes of the decision problem 
under consideration  are  of the  same order of magnitude,  the 
distance (Euclidean norm) from the reference point to the alter-
natives seems,  in the absence of user preferences to the con-
trary, to be a good basis for comparison. However, if they are 
orders of magnitude different, as is the case with risk and cost, 
this  method will  always  act to preferentially minimise the  dif-
ference of the numerically larger attribute (i.e. cost) because the 
difference in  the other attribute (risk)  is  numerically negligible 
in  comparison. 
When  the  values  of  the  attributes  have  the  same  order  of 
magnitude, and no scaling factor is used, it is roughly equivalent 
to using the attribute mean as a scaling factor when the attributes 
are of quite different magnitude. The user should be aware that 
how the attributes are weighted. Other possible scaling factors 
are the maximum, the minimum or the  reference point values 
for  each  attribute. The  use  of the  maximum or the  minimum 
penalises alternatives with a large standard deviation, while the 
use  of  the  reference  point  leaves  the  user open  to  possible 
charges of manipulating the outcome, since it is he who selects 
the  reference point to begin with. This  is especially true if the 
system  is  to  be  used to justify decisions  in  a  policy context. 
However, it should be noted that it is only when· trying to deter-
mine the efficient point that scaling factors are important, the 
Pareto set being  independent of scaling. 
Another possibility is the application of penalisation factors to 
penalise alternative with  all  attribute values inside the positive 
cone in the criteria space with its vertex at the reference point. 
Using the penalisation factor  p  the equation (5) is changed to: 
(6) 
For  example Pi  = 100  may be  if  f;  <X;. This  means  that at-
tributes outside the preferred area penalised by approximately 
a factor 10. In all other cases, Pi  = 1 has been used. Of course 
p should be  considered as an  input variable,  and  the calcula-
tions can  therefore be  repeated with different values. 
The method described above is used both in I  RIMS and in HELP, 
and it should be  stressed that this is  only on.e  of a number of 
possible decision support models. 
The  IRIMS System 
The  lspra  Risk  Management Support (IRIMS)  System /3/ was 
developed by the Joint Research Centre with support from con-
tracts given  to  the  International  Institute for Applied  Systems 
Analysis.  Its primary goal was to demonstrate the feasibility of 
a system which integrates data bases with a set of simulation 
models  diverse enough  to analyse the  complete life  cycle of 
hazardous  substance,  e.g.,  the  risk  arising  in  manufacture, 
transportation, product use, and waste treatment and disposal. 
The  data  bases  and  simulation  models  are  linked to a  multi-
attribute decision support tool which allows the evaluation of alter-
native risk management strategies. In  fig.  1 the general struc-
ture of IRIMS and the interactions with the user is shown. The 
user may get information directly from the databases, from the 
simulation model (and give input to them) and interact with the 
decision support system. 
I  RIMS  USER 
I 
DATABASES  L  _, 
I 
~ 
J  i 
l 
L  -- SIMULATION  MODELS  L  .. 
~ 
I 
•  + 
I 
DECISION  SUPPORT  I 
whatever scaling factors are chosen, they implicitly determines  Fig.  1 - General structure of /RIMS 
23 A further goal  of IRIMS was to design  an  attractive and easy 
to use interface that would make the system accessible to peo-
ple without experience of computer technology (but with an ade-
quate technical  understanding of the problems under study). 
The  design  process,  described  elsewhere  /4/,  included  a 
workshop  of  policy  makers  to  elicit  their  views  as  to  which 
features the system should have. 
The  IRIMS data bases,  containing  information  relevant to risk 
management, are valuable sources of information in  their own 
right and also provide inputs to the simulation models. The data 
bases  include  information  about  properties  of  chemical 
substances, the chemical industry, past industrial accidents, rele-
vant laws and  regulations,  and geographical features. 
The simulation models were mostly pre-existing pieces of soft-
ware which were adapted for use in I  RIMS. They are the transpor-
tation risk model (which will be described in  more detail later), 
the waste treatment and disposal model, a group of models which 
form the environmental impact analysis module, and models for 
the analysis of the chemical industry and specific chemical pro-
cesses. To aid in decision support. a multi-criteria optimisation 
routine, based on the reference point approach (described above), 
is  included. 
The I  RIMS system has an open, modular structure so that new 
models can be introduced as needed for particular applications. 
The models and data bases are integrated through an interface 
(of slightly above average intelligence) which interacts with the 
user through  high-resolution  colour graphics and  easy-to-use, 
mouse-actuated menus which require almost no key board in-
put. All results are displayed in graphical form. The present ver-
sion of the system is  a demonstration prototype, implemented 
IRIMS TOP  LEVEL  MASTER  MENU: 
Hazardous Substances Database 
Industrial Accidents Reports 
EC  Directives and  Regulations 
Geographical and  Regional  Databases 
Chemical Industry Databases 
Industrial Structure Optimization 
Chemical Production Technologies 
Process Plant Risk  Analysis:  SAFETI 
Industrial Waste Streams  Database 
Transportation Risk/Cost Analysis 
Environmental  Impact Assessment 
Multi-Criteria Data Evaluation 
EXPLAIN  CURRENT  MENU  OPTIONS 
SELECT TO  STOP  AND QUIT IRIMS 
to select a menu item, position the mouse pointer, and press 
the  left mouse button ... 
Fig. 2- The  main menu of the /RIMS  system 
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Import 
Import 
on a dedicated SUN-3 workstation. On fig. 2 and 3 two examples 
of the graphical interface is  shown: 
The IRIMS.system is now being customised for a case study of 
the risks associated with the production, transportation and use 
of  chlorine  in  the  Netherlands.  This  is  being  done  in  the 
framework of a formal collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of 
Housing,  Physical  Planning  and  the  Environment (VROM). 
I  RIMS has now been demonstrated to a number of potential user 
organisations. These demonstrations found  a great deal  of  in-
terest in the IRIMS approach, but have also revealed an interest 
amongst smaller regional authorities and specilised agencies in 
decision  support  systems  that  could  be  hosted  on  less 
sophisticated workstations. 
Thus  it  was decided to' explore the  idea  of a  "micro-IRIMS" 
system, hosted on a personal computer. To test feasibility, IRIMS 
software relevant to decisions about the transportation of hazar-
dous substances was transported to a PC, and a geographic data 
base was  developed  for the  Italian  region  of  Lombardy.  This 
system, known as HELP, is described in greater detail in the next 
section. 
The  HELP System 
The hardware system selected for the development of HELP is 
one that could be available to many potential users: the IBM PC 
AT  with  the  MS  DOS  operating  system  which  allows  mixed 
language programming, eg,  Fortran, C and  Pascal,  and  is the 
operating system for a wide range of IBM-compatible computers. 
Modelled on  IRIMS,  HELP contains a data base,  a transporta-
tion risk model and a multi-attribute decision model which are 
integrated through  a graphic interface /5/,  as  shown  in  fig.  5. 
Prototype Demonstration Version  12/86. All  rights  Reserved. 
This software system is developed under contract to the Commission 
of the European Communities, CEC, Joint Research Centre, lspra Esta-
blishment, Italy, by the International Institute for Applied Systems Ana-
lysis  IIASA,  A-2361  Laxenburg,  Austria. 
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Exposure Industrial Accident Scenario 
Location:  3.4  W  54.6  N 
Substance:  tracer 
Amount  released:  1000  Kg 
Season:  Spring 
Weather:  sun/storm 
Starting hour:  12 hrs 
Simulation  period:  5 days 
Groundlevel  concentration: 
after 1  h:  59.68  g/m3 
after 6h:  0.24  g/m3 
position  estimates: 
1.  g/m2: 
deposition: 
remaining: 
Simulation  time: 
884.05  km2 
998.17  Kg 
1.83  kg 
120 hrs 
----- Spring/12:00/sun/storm 
press  any  MOUSE  SUlTON to continue 
waiting for user input! 
Fig.  3- Example of Graphical display of results in  /RIMS 
user  interlace:  IBM  PC/ AT 
Gratica  EGA 
Fig.  7- Scheme of the overall HELP system 
The  Transportation Module 
This  module  is  based on  HASTM  (the  Hazardous Substances 
Transpo-rtation  Model),  a  model  for  risk  and  cost  analysis of 
transportation /6/. 
The HELP transportation module describes the road network in 
terms of a graph with arcs and nodes. The nodes represent the 
most important settlements and the arcs segments of the roads 
connecting settlements. Each arc is characterised by its length 
and one of four possible road types. Route generation between 
paint of origin and destination of the shipment is based on the 
heuristic assumption that "shorter is better", thus a branch and 
bounds technique is used. The risks and costs of each alternative 
are then calculated. The cost function is a simple, linear function: 
(7) 
where C1 represents fixed costs and Ckm  is the variable costs. 
The variable costs depend on the size of the shipment and the 
route  length, as follows:  · 
Ckm=C0 +C1·min(x,x) +C2·max(O,x-x)  (8) 
where x  represents a step change in tariff. The risk calculation 
is based on accident statistics on hazardous material transpor-
tation in terms of injuries, deaths and property damage for each 
type of route, assuming a log-normal distribution for the estima-
tion of consequences. The probability of an accident occurring 
in an arc,  r,  of length L kilometre, with the probability of occur-
rence/km,  p(rtc),  is: 
Pa ( r) = 1 - (  1 - p ( r ~  )  ) L  (9) 
If the entire route is formed by N arcs, the total probability of 
an  accident is: 
N 
P =  1:  II (  1 - Pa ( r k)) · P  a ( r i) 
i=1  k<i 
(1 0) 
25 q1 is defined as the probability that, if an accident occurs, it oc-
curs in a particular land-use category, t, and using the log-normal 
distribution, the expected value of the consequences Care given 
by: 
T  11  +.1a2 
C=Iq·e't  2  t 
1=1  t 
(11) 
where Jl and a2 represent the expected value and variance of 
the distribution. Multiplying probability of occurrence and distribu-
tion of consequences we have the expected value of the risk,  R: 
As the decision maker must consider more than the expected 
value of risk, i.e. the maximum consequences, the variances are 
also relevant. Following Aitchison-Brown (7) the variance can be 
expressed as: 
(13) 
This defines the problem in terms of seven criteria, six related 
to risk (mean and variance of deaths, injuries and damage) and 
one for the total  cost. 
The  Data  Base 
Data on geographic characteristics and on traffic and accident 
densities have been acquired for the Italian region of Lombar-
dy. Cost data from the Federal Republic of Germany have been 
used (8) and informal checks confirm that they are consistent 
with  Italian shipping costs. 
Information on the individual nodes and arcs of the road network 
was generated using a semi-automatic system of image digitalisa-
tion developed at our centre by Peckham /9/  in  which a road 
map image is stored directly in  computer memory using a PC-
Vision system /1 0/. The resulting data base contains coordinates 
of each settlement and the distances between them, labelled with 
the appropriate land use categori, i.e. urban, suburban and rural. 
Risk calculations are based on  historical data from Lombardy 
/11, 12/ on accident frequency per year for each category of road. 
It should be noted that there is considerable uncertainty on the 
derived data. Consequences are estimated using a probability 
distribution /13/ which uses historical data on accident severity 
in  various land use categories. The digitised network is shown 
in  fig.  5,  and  in  fig.  6 a detailed scheme of HELP  is  shown. 
Discussion 
The implementation of the IRIMS prototype has indeed shown 
that the integrated approach towards risk management is feasi-
ble,  and that it is possible to design software systems to  sup-
port these decisions. The hardware chosen for I  RIMS turned out 
to be very good for this application, though not readily available 
to all potential users. Finally these discussions about portability 
lead to the design of the HELP  system. 
The HELP system is a example of the  "micro-IRIMS" system 
mentioned earlier,  scaled-down  in  scope  and  hosted  on  less 
sophisticated hardware. The hardWare chosen for HELP was a 
lBM PC (AT 2 with graphics). Even for this relatively large per-
sonal computer, unforeseen problems emerged in adapting soft-
ware from the SUN-3 (with UNIX operating system) which hosts 
I  RIMS. 
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Fig.  5 - Road Network of the Italian Region  Lombardy 
I  I  "------- --------· 
r-------- -------, 
PATH  GEN 
Data  file 
of  non-dominated set 
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Decision  module 
L--------------
Decision  process 
Altenatives  generation 
Fig.  6- Detailed HELP scheme 
METAWINDOWS 
Software  of 
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SCREEN 
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Our conclusion from this first micro-IRIMS pilot experience is that 
smaller decision support systems are indeed feasible,  and the 
size and capabilities of the hardware will depend upon the needs 
of the client and the particular applicatton. It seems clear, that 
the IBM-AT would be the smallest system compatible with the 
demands of a system intended for real operational use. In addi-
tion to system size, higher resolution colour graphics would be 
an advantage as would a UNIX operating environment to facilitate 
the use of mixed programming languages. An  IBM  System 2 computer is  on  order and  will be  evaluated 
to assess its suitability. In any case, it seems clear that if a deci-
sion support tool is to gain widespread use, it must be available 
on  some  "mainstream"  computer  system.  We  are  also  col-
laborating  in  the organisation of a workshop of policy makers 
from regional regulatory authorities which will ascertain the de-
mand for smaller decision support tools and,  if so,  what user 
needs are. 
With  respect to the reference-point based,  multi-attribute deci-
sion  support tool,  used  in  both  IRIMS and  HELP,  we  intend to 
explore the implications of introducing a scaling factor into the 
procedure for evaluating decision alternatives. This is not a trival 
problem, since slightly different scaling methods can give a quite 
different  ordering  of  alternatives  and,  in  fact,  even  have 
philosophical implications for the decision process. It is therefore 
important that users are aware of the effects of scaling methods 
(and  even  of not  scaling  at all),  so  that the  choice of scaling 
method can  be  done  in  a transparent way. 
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27 RESEARCH  ACTIVITIES 
3.  Protection  Against  Runaway  Reactions 
In chemical processes, runaway reactions, i.e. exothermic reac-
tions getting out of control, represent a potential hazard source. 
These processes may happen not only during chemical process-
ing  but  also at storage. 
The consequences of such incidents result  in  loss of contain-
ment ranging  from controlled venting via an  emergency relief 
system through mild ejection of a part of the reactor inventory 
into the working area, to explosive rupture of the reactor which, 
in some cases, is followed by a fire and/or a secondary explosion. 
Depending on the nature of the released materials (flammable, 
explosive, toxic) risks do exist for the personnel, the plant and, 
in some cases, even for surrounding areas both on- and off-site. 
Quite often runaway reactions play an important part in the chain 
of a developing incident, therefore, the aim of the present ac-
tivity is (a) to investigate their characteristic features in order to 
develop early detection and process control systems anticipating 
uncontrolled  runaway  excursions  and  (b)  to  study  venting 
characteristics of reactive mixtures  in  order to prevent over-
pressurisation or overheating due to uncontrolled reactions in 
process plants. 
A  further  aim  is  the  development  of  physical  models  and 
mathematical tools for the scaling up of laboratory tests to real 
scale facility for safe plant venting lay out. This implies also the 
study of the  limitation of scaling  up  laws. 
The research activity can be distinguished into two complemen-
tary activities: 
behaviour of chemical process dynamics under runaway con-
ditions, to be performed in  the  FIRES; 
- the relief and venting of containment systems, i.e. multiphase 
multicomponent flow regimes  in  vessels, venting ducts and 
safety (pressure) relief devices, performed in the MPMC test 
facility. 
The experimental activities are supported by theoretical studies 
based on JRC multiphase-multicomponent (MPMC) computational 
fluid dynamics expertise developed during the last few years in 
connection with the  nuclear safety research  programme. The 
main objective of these theoretical studies is to develop com-
puter models capable of giving  reliable predictions concArning 
runaway reactions in  batch reactors and associated emergen-
cy relief systems. The activity is closely associated with the Fl RES 
experimental programme and the test analysis of MPMC  flow 
of non-reactive fluids. 
JRC has contributed as member scientifically to the DIERS Users 
Group (DUG). 
Objectives 
The  overall  objectives for the both  activities are: 
Process dynamics under runaway conditions: 
- identification of dangerous states of some selected chemical 
reactions: 
•  nitration 
•  polymerisation 
•  diazotisation 
•  oxidation 
•  decomposition 
- development of a safety approach based on "dangerous states 
control" (complementary to the approach on venting  relief). 
- validation of codes. 
Venting  and  relief systems,  limited to the thermohydraulics of 
MPMC fluids with and without exothermal  heat sources: 
- understanding of prc?totypical  phenomena; 
- availability of quantitative data for the development of basic 
models,  describing the state of the: 
•  fluid within the reaction vessel 
•  flow in  tubes,  opening and quenching systems. 
- scaling questions with respect to geometry anq physical pro-
perties of components involved. 
Objectives for 1987 were: 
- further design and  construction of FIRES; 
- validation studies of models (SAFIRE); 
- phenomenological study of the influence of the influence of 
the geometry and physical properties on two-phase fluid flow 
regimes; 
- reference depressurisation tests with water for multiphase-
multicomponent investigations; 
- parametric studies with SAFIRE. 
The following activities are foreseen: 
- after commissioning, calibration and bench test performance 
of  FIRES  and  FISIM,  experiments  will  be  performed  with 
chemical reactions (of very high kinetics type (instant), such 
as  neutralisation),  followed  by  (endothermic)  reactions with, 
kinetics,  than  can be quantified; 
- experiments with chemical reactions (well-known kinetics) with 
possible  runaway properties, especially 
•  toluene mononitration by mixed acid; 
•  suspension  polymerisation of methyl  methacrylate; 
•  the diazotisation as subject of experiment is yet in  phase 
of investigation. 
- "in-vessel" fluid state will be investigated on phase and com-
ponent distribution for given pressure, temperature, physical 
distribution for given components, and constraint in  case of 
no chemical reaction, as well as in case of superimposed reac-
tions present. 
fluid flow in venting tubes and release to "ambient" (quenching 
systems): 
•  flow characteristic modelling; 
•  phenomenological and  quantitative understanding of fluid 
dynamic processes; 
29 •  quantification of the influence of the geometry (length and 
diameter) and properties (surface tension and viscosity) on 
the  flow characteristics in  order to make correlations or 
codes for the prediction of venting characteristics available; 
- "release" into a storage tank, limiting to the quenching of the 
vapour phase, separation of the gaseous phase and cooling 
in order to use this design component for modelling a process 
plant with respect to the back pressure effects and back coupl-
ing effects on the flow in the discharge tubes and flow regime 
in  the  reaction vessel  in  case of emergency venting; 
- development of "system codes"  (of  systems  consisting  of 
chemical  reactors,  venting  lines  and  storage-quenching 
devices)  based  on  measurements  of  the  reaction 
characteristics of prototypical chemical reaction classes and 
or real  reaction  processes,  which  includes the problem  of 
scaling; 
- the influence of the up-scaling (from lab.  scale to real  size) 
on the reaction p(Ocess and the thermodynamic state condi-
tions of the system, particularly concerning geometry pressure 
and temperature. A feasibility study is going on for a large scale 
test facility consisting of a chemical reactor, venting lines and 
storage - quenching device with following properties: volume 
20 m3,  scaling  ratio steps from 1:100 to 1:1,  max. pressure 
250 bar,  max.  temp.  450°C. 
Results 
The  main results of this research activity can be summurised 
as follows: progress of the realisation of FIRES, the perforamce 
of six studies and experiments on MPMC fluid flow, code valida-
tion and a plenar meeting of the ECG-RR on 19-20 March 1987. 
3.1  FIRES 
The activities were mainly devoted to the design, construction, 
installation and  equipment of the  FIRES,  as  like as  the set  up 
of the annexed chemical lab. 
The FIRES (Facility for Investigating Runaway Events Safely), con-
sisting  basically of a bach type  chemical  reactor,  completely 
equipped and instrumented to carry out batch and semi-batch 
type chemical processes, enables to pursue the following  ob-
jectives: 
- experimental  verification  of models  for  conditions  close  to 
runaway; 
- test and development of detection, identification and control 
techniques to prevent  runaway (early warning  systems); 
- assessment of procedures for fast shutdown. 
The FIRES consists of a chemical reactor completely equipped 
with  a  fast-shut-down  system  (relief  system,  stopping-by-fast-
injection device, fast-emptying-an(}cooling system), measurement 
··instrumentation,  condenser,  of  an  early  warning  system,  a 
simulator and a data acquisition system as well as of auxiliary 
equipment  like  reagents  insertion system,  cover atmosphere, 
cooling/heating system. The reactor and a part of its equipment 
are housed in  a bunker consisting of a 6 m diam. steel safety 
containment, anchered to a reinforced concrete basement, while 
auxiliary plant, control room, chemical laboratory, reagent store, 
equipment room,  etc.  are ontside the experimental bunker. 
Chemical  reactor 
The  inside  glass-lined  reactor  is  of  a  conventional  type, 
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characterised by a volume of 100 I,  a max. pressure of 16 bar 
and a max. temperature of 525°K and equipped with an integral 
standard cooling jacket system (completed by a glass-lined con-
denser of  equivalent  capacity as  the  heat  exchanger)  and  a 
stirrer. 
Fast-shut-down  system 
This fast-shut-down system is based on three mutually indepen-
dent emergency devices: (a)  a safety relief device (realised by 
a bursting disc working at 5 bar) with venting system, (b) a stop-
ping device by fast injection of an inhabiter by an automatically 
working mechanism and (c) a fast emptying and cooling system 
based on slowing down of the kinetics of the reactions by lower-
ing the temperature of the reacting mass, which is obtained by 
a fast discharge into a tank partially filled with an inert liquid fluid 
at  lowest temperature. 
Reactor instrumentation 
The  instruments are very sensitive and shall  measure at high 
precision (temp.  at  + 0.04°K, pressure at  + 0.08 bar,  pH  at 
+ 0.02, Redox potential 0.1 %, electr. conductivity 0.1 %) in order 
to assure an accurate and consequently reliable supervision of 
the main  parameter affecting the  reaction,  realised by an  on-
line detection with  distributed control  system. 
Early warning  system 
The  "early warning" system  is based on  the  instrumentation, 
filtering and analysis of the temperature of the reacting mass 
and  of  the  heat  transfer  fluid; computing  and  analysing  the 
respective derivates and  starting than an  alarm signal. 
Simulator 
The  FISIM  (Fires SIMulator) as  mathematical  simulator  is  an 
essential supporting tool  for the safe and  optimal operation of 
FIRES, which can represent the influence of the main operating 
conditions (stirring, heat transfer, insertion of reactants, etc), can 
charaterise  the  vapour  phase,  can  consider  the  reactor  ac-
cessories, can follow the evolution of the chemical system and 
its main deviations from the ideal  situation as fas as the ther-
modynamical and  fluid-dynamical  aspects are concerned. 
Control  and  Data Acquisition System (DAS) 
The  distributed control  system is  based on  a micr<>computer, 
heading the hierarchy, with a processor. The system manages 
the data acquisition and plant control sub-systems using a PC 
control peripheral, which  is controlled by programmable logic. 
Moreover  the  DAS  has  a  "historical"  data  base  which 
automatically supplies the behaviour of the various magnitudes 
being  controlled,  as  a function of various time bases. 
Experimental  reactions 
The following chemical  reactions are planned to be subject of 
experiment. 
- Toluene mononitration by mixed acid 
The  reaction is highly exothermic and the problem is accen-
tuated because of the heat of dilution of the nitrating acid (mix-
ed  acid) and  the  low heat capacity of the medium. 
As the organic species are only sparingly soluble in the acid, 
industrial nitration is a heterogeneous process involving two 
liquid  phases:  an  acid (or  aqueous)  phase  and  an  organic 
phase. This means that in order to decribe the nitration in these 
conditions,  two  phenomena,  taking  place  simultaneously, 
should be  considered: 
•  chemical  reaction 
•  interphase mass transfer | 
,,
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- Suspension polymerisation of methyl methacrylate
This is an exothermic  reaction with many industrial applica-
tions. lt is characterised  by having  free-radial kinetics with an
autoacceleration phenomenon  known  as the "gel effect", that
is a reduction in the termination rate of polymer chain radicals
due to the increase in viscosity of the particles  at high con-
version. This produces a rise in the net rate of polymerisation.
The inmiscible monomer is placed in an acqueous phase and
dispersed by agitation. The water serves as both the disper-
sion medium and as a heart transfer agent with the advan-
tage that moderate  viscosities throughout the reaction are
obtained.
3.2 MPMC fluid flow in relief venting systems
The following studies and experiments (on the MPMGTF) have
been performed:
- influence  of the geometry and physical properties on the flow
regime;
- MPMC basic studies
- parameters  Studies of SAFIRE  Code
Flow regime sfudies
The experiments were performed  in 120 cm long cylinders  of
16,20 and 40 mm diameter filled with fluid. Air was fed into the
cylinder from the bottom through a frit. Two pressure pick-ups,
40 cm apart along the flow path allowed the mean density
measurement  of the mixture.  High speed photographs were taken
in order to correlate the flow pattern with void fraction and gas
flow rate.
The studies  were performed with stagnant liquid and cover the
following  range of parameter  variations:
Diameter: 16, 20, 40 mm
Surface tension: 72,3 m N/m, 34,4 m N/m
Viscosity:  58, 23; 275', 280 times the viscosity  of water
(q= l'o cP)
Air flow rate.  from  1 ,6 . 1G3 m3/h to 0,8 m3/h
lnfluence of the geometry on the flow pattern
It is common  knowledge in twophase flow that the change of
the diameter at unchanged gas loading  entails a change of the
flow pattern. This is enhanced with altering the surface tension
and viscosity  of the fluid. Tests with demineralised  water are per
formed for reference.  Fig. 1 shows the flow pattern  map as a
O = 72.07 mN/m
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function of void fraction gas flow rate and diameter. The
characteristic flow patterns at 0,1 m3/h gas flow rate for three
different tube diameters  are shown in Fig. 2.By only changing
the diameter of about a factor of two, the flow pattern changes
from bubble flow to long slug flow independent  of the tube length.
Fig. 2 gives an example of the flow pattern at a gas flow rate
of 0,1 m3/h which is also reproduced in Fig. 1. The influence of
the geometry on the flow pattern is more pronounced for fluids
with higher surface tension.
Fig. 2 - lnfluence of the geometry on the flow pattern
(demineralized  water, = 6439 mN/m, gas flow
rate: 0,1 mslh)
Table | - Pattern
B lbubble I  bubbles  of 0<114 tube o "d"
B ll bubble ll  bubbles  of 1/4 d.o<3/5  d
S I slug I  slug length L < 1,5 d
S ll slug ll  slug length 1,5 d < L < 4 d
S lll slug lll  slug length L > 4 d
SC semi-churn
SD slugdome
SO slug oval
G  grapes
C  cigar
A  annular
F  foam
FS foam-slug
lnfluence of the surface tension (adding traces of Falterol)
The change of the fluid surface tension has a strong influence
on the flow pattern. In the present  tests, the surface tension was
changed  to half of that of demineralised  water. The resulting flow
pattern, due to changing only the surface tension, is shown  in
Fig. 3. As shown, slug flow or transient flow patterns do not ag
pear. Independent  of the diameter of the test cylinder, only bub-
ble flow at low gas flow rate, which changes immediately  into
foam flow, has been observed. The effect of the surface ten-
sion on the flow oattern for different  tube diameters  but cons-
tant gas flow can be shown. One notes the tendency of the gas
bubbles to agglomerate.  Bubble coolescence  is only observed
at high gas loading rate which seems to be due to hydrodynamic
mechanisms.
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Fig.  3 - Void  Fraction  Versus  Gas Flow Rate 
Influence of the viscosity (adding  Luviskol) 
The effect of the viscosity on the flow pattern is very differen-
tiated, especially as far as the flow pattern configurations are 
concerned. Flow patterns not yet reported in the literature have 
been observed: for example, at low gas flow rate and fluid viscosi-
ty TJ  > 200  TJ  H20  grape-like clusters dominate the flow regime. 
Another stable configuration observed for a viscosity range of 
100 to 340 times that of demineralised water is the mushroomlike 
slug-chain configuration which appears at the transient from bub-
ble regime to fully developed slug  regime. 
So the alteration of the flow pattern at identical test conditions 
but varying viscosity could be identified. A general survey of the 
effect of viscosity on the flow regime is shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 
8. The diagrams show that with increasing viscosity the "cigar 
type slug' and annular flow regime  become dominant. 
The significance of these studies is to draw the attention to the 
importance of the physical properties on two-phase regimes. The 
studies will be continued and extended also to forced convec-
tion  flow of the  liquid component. 
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MULITPHASE  - MULTICOMPONENT 
TEST  FACILITY 
REACTION  VESSEL  X 2 Cr  N1  180 
Oes1gn  pressure·  15  bar 
Oes1gn  temperature  • 250°C 
Transducer 
Capacity  50/20  hires  Thermocouple 
Fig.  6- Multiphase - Multicomponent Test  Facility 
(bar) 
f 
11 
10 
9 
8 
7 
6 
4 
3 
- - --- pressure  gauge:  C13 
pressure  gauge: 
vessel  pressure 
1----~---.----r---.---~-------.----r---~ 
0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70 
Fig.  7- Depressurisation history (vessel pressure) 
80  90 
t(sec) 
Basic studies on  multiphase-multicomponent fluid flow 
The basic studies on MPMC fluid flow have been performed on 
the small scale MPMC-TF. This adopted (for ex.  equipped with 
additional  measure  instruments) existing  test  facility consists 
mainly of a lower pressurisation (50 I) vessel, a (1 ,5 m) test sec-
tion and a flashing vessel with a quenching capacity of 100 kW. 
(see schema, fig.  6) This test facility enables to study the flow (bar) 
t 
of MPMC mixtures in ducts and its flashing into a vessel under 
controlled conditions, where void fraction and component velocity 
can be measured with special methods and sensors. Two test 
sections  of  20  and  40  mm  diameter  with  pressure  and 
temperature junctions and windows for visualisation have been 
constructed and the necessary equipment for surface tension 
and viscosity measurement has been installed. Since one of the 
measuring methods of the phase and component distribution in 
the  venting  duct has  been  based  on  simultaneous closing  of 
valves up- and downstream of the test section, extensive calibra-
tion tests have been  performed. 
The facility is  being prepared at present for tests with decom-
posing  fluids  (H20 2)  in  order to simulate  runaway  processes 
under known  conditions. 
During  the  1987  reporting  period  emphasis  was  given  on 
depressurisation tests with demineralised water being used as 
reference data for the investigation of venting characteristics of 
fluids with variable properties. Tests were performed at the follow-
ing  initial  conditions: 
Vessel  pressure:  5,  1  0 and 15 bar 
Back pressure:  1 and 5 bar 
Filling:  90,  75  and  50% 
Typical  results  of some  tests (performed  at  initial  conditions: 
vessel pressure 10 bar, back pressure: 1 bar, filling 90%, fluid: 
demineralised water) are shown  in  figures 7,  8 and  9. 
Fig. 7 shows the pressure history in the vessel following the open-
ing of the relief valve venting into the quenching vessel at 1 bar. 
Venting started at 90% filling and terminated at saturation cor-
responding to the quenching vessel pressure (filling at the end 
of venting: v: 1J = '""'-../  55%). 
As shown, 80% of the pressurisation was released in a time span 
of 25 seconds.  Fig.  8 shows measurements along the venting 
section in C13.  In contrast to the pressure in the vessel strong 
instabilities occur. 
Information of the "in vessel" situation can  be  obtained from 
"on line" level and the pressure measurements. The recording 
of fig.  9 shows a fast "level decrease" during the first venting 
phase followed by volume "swelling" which can be  attributed 
to bulk boil off. Another characteristic feature of the depressurisa-
tion of demineralised water is the delay in boiling which exhibits 
also fig.  7. 
The  analysis of the experimental  results is  underway. 
Conclusions at this state of progress would  be  premature. 
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3.3  Modelling of  runaway  reactions 
The DIERS' computer code SAFIRE is a generally designed code 
capable of analysing several types of chemical reactors. As part 
of the "Industrial Hazards" Programme, the work started with 
a general parametric overview study of the SAFIRE code for non-
reactive water depressurisation tests under different physical, 
operational and vent size parameters. The dimensions correspon-
ding to the available MPMC test rig  have been chosen as stan-
dard geometric and operation conditions. These studies, which 
have been initiated in August 1987, are still in progress and will 
be compared with experimental results for verification of the used 
physical models and to check whether operational conditions and 
the  variation  of  the  size  and  length  of  the  venting  line  are 
reproduced. 
The assessment of the SAFIRE code /1/ has been undertaken 
with the analysis of the following problems: 
a.  water blowdown of a partially filled vessel through a long pipe 
and comparison with experimental data from the Multicom-
ponent Multiphase Test Facility MPMC-TF JRC-Ispra and with 
calculations performed with the computer code RELAP5/EUR; 
b.  fluoridric  acid  discharge  from  a  storage  vessel  and  com-
parison with separate calculations made by the firm SNAM 
with a TNO  computer code,  and 
c.  cumene hydroperoxidation reaction and comparison with ex-
perimental data found  in  open  literature. 
SAFIRE's capabilities have been  improved by adding as time-
dependent variables the inflow of reactants into the reactor vessel 
(see point d). The code has also been modified in order to over-
come convergence problems encountered in  some cases and 
an ancillary graphical package has been implemented. Input data 
sets are now easily prepared with the help of a JAG-developed 
interface called SAFIN, which consists of a series of menus to 
be  chosen  by the user. 
a.  Water blowdown tests. 
This section deals with a series of three water depressurisation 
experiments performed with the MPMC-TF (see  fig.  6). 
Various initial pressures and void fractions have been investigated 
in  the three experiments and the corresponding data are sum-
marised in Table II. All the tests considered have been perform-
ed under saturation conditions. According to the observed flow 
regime  in  the pipe, the SAFIRE  calculations have been  made 
using the partial vapour-liquid disengagement option with churn 
turbulent  flow  in  the  vessel  coupled  with  the  homogeneous 
equilibrium model for the long pipe description /2/. The formula-
33 tion used in SAFIRE for the vessel flow is based on the 1  D drift 
flux model proposed by Wallis /3/ and Zuber /4/.  In the modell-
ing of the transient vapour-liquid disengagement, the vapour mass 
fraction  entering  the vessel  vent  line  is  determined  from  the 
following  relation (representing mass conservation  /21): 
X· V · Q  I  (1) 
~  =- 1-CoE"·a 
where: 
x  = vapour  mass  fraction  entering  the vent  line  during  two 
phase vent flow 
v  =  vapour phase specific volume 
Q  =  vent to vessel  area ratio 
G  =mass flow 
C0  =  radial distribution or shape parameter used in the drift flux 
model 
u  =  rise velocity of individual bubbles 
a  =  (1-x) I (Rx) 
R  =  vapour to liquid  specific volume  ratio 
A  =at (1-C0 ) 
a  =  average void fraction  in  the vessel 
£  = (1-a}n I (1-arn) 
n,m  =  correlation parameters to be chosen according to the 
vessel  flow  regime adopted 
Table II:  Main SAFIRE  input data used for the calculations of 
MPMC  tests  "1 ",  "2"  and  "3" concerning  water 
blowdown 
TEST  "1"  TEST  ''2''  TEST  "3" 
VESSEL  DATA: 
Initial  pressure  0.62  MPa  1.03  MPa  0.66  MPa 
Initial  temperature  433.  K  454.  K  435.  K 
Initial  void  fraction  0.36  0.10  0.001 
Vessel  volume  0.05  m3  0.053  0.05  m3 
Vessel  diameter  0.4  m  0.4  m  0.4  m 
''Radial  distribution  factor''  1., 1.4  1., 1.4  1.4 
VENTING  PIPE  DATA: 
Pipe  length  1.5 m  1.5 m  1.5 m 
Pipe  diameter  0.02  m  0.02  m  0.02  m 
QUENCH  VESSEL  DATA: 
Initial  pressure  0.15  MPa  0.25  MPa  0.101  MPa 
As described in /2/ the parameter C0  is defined by the relation: 
<ai>  c  =  0  <a>· <i> 
where j  indicated the superficial velocity and  the  symbol  <  > 
represents an area average property. The value Co  =  1 defines 
an ideal 1  D system with uniform radial void fraction distibution. 
As  a  result  of  DIERS  investigations /5/ a value C0  =  1.5 has 
been recommended for the interpretation of water depressurisa-
tion data. 
With regard to the MPMC-TF water blowdown tests summaris-
ed  in  column  1 and 2 of Table  II,  the value C0  =  1.4 for the 
SAFIRE calculations has been found to be the most appropriate 
for reproducing the experiment data.  Figs.  1  0 and  11  show the 
pressure (A),  the  void  fraction  (B)  and  the  inventory (C)  time 
histories in the vessel for tests 1 and 2,  respectively.  In all the 
figures, the experimental data and the SAFIRE calculations made 
with C0  =  1 and C0  =  1  .4 are represented. It is possible to see 
that  with  the  latter  value  of  C0 ,  SAFIRE  can  successfully 
reproduce the variables measured. 
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Test  3 (see  Table  II  - third  column)  has  been  calculated with 
SAFIRE and with the JRC version of the USNRC code RELAP5 
named RELAP5/EUR /6/,  /7/.  RELAP5/EUR  is a 1  D code based 
on a ''five equations'' model which has been extensively validated 
against more than 50 water blowdown experiments in the JRC-
LOBI facility which is used for the simulation of thermo-hydraulic 
transients in a LWR cooling circuit.  Fig.  12 (A) shows the com-
parison between pressure time histories calculated with the two 
codes and the experimental data. Fig. 12 (B) represents the com-
parison  between  the void  fraction time histories computed by 
SAFIRE abd RELAP5/EUR.  In fig.  13 similar comparisons for the 
mass flow rate (B) and for the vessel inventory (A) time histories 
are shown. The agreement between computed results and ex-
perimentala data  is  satisfactory. 
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Fig.  12- Comparison between SAFIRE,  RELAP5 and 
experimental data concerning the water blowdown 
test "3" performed with  the MPMC-TF 
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Fig.  13- Comparison between SAFIRE and RELAPS 
concerning the water blowdown test "3" 
b.  Fluoridric acid (HF)  discharge from  a storage vessel 
For safety analysis the firm SNAM  has performed the assess-
ment of the discharge of a fluoridric acid storage vessel  in the 
case of rupture of the bottom discharge pipe. The initial condi-
tions assumed are: pressure = 0.189 MPa, temperature = 311 
K, void fraction  =  0.001  and mass of the liquid acid (in satura-
tion conditions)  =  61000 kg.  The model  adopted for the vent 
system is  a bottom nozzle of diameter  =  0.02 m.  The SNAM 
calculations have been made with a computer code developed 
by the dutch Bureau for Industrial Safety TNO /8/. The calcula-
tions performed by the JRC differ from those made by SNAM 
only in the temperature dependence of the HF physical proper-
ties which are taken into account by SAFIRE but are considered 
constant in  the TNO computer code. 
In fig. 14 the mass evacuated versus time predicted by the two 
codes  are  represented.  The  comparison  between  the  mass 
velocity and the vessel temperature time histories have been also 
computed with the two codes. Negligible discrepancies between 
the calculated results demonstrate that temperature dependence 
of  the  HF  properties  can  be  disregarded  in  the  range  of 
temperature considered.  In  addition  it can be concluded that 
SAFIRE  results are consistent with the TNO code predictions. 
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Fig.  14 - Acid storage VESSEL  voiding - mass evacuated 
versus  time 
c.  Cumene hydroperoxidation reaction 
In  order to assess how SAFIRE can  represent chemical reac-
tions,  the  isothermal  hydroperoxidation  of  the  cumene  in-
vestigated in calorimetric scale by Fortuin and Waterman /9/ was 
submitted for code calculation. The  reaction considered is the 
following one: 
C6H5CH  (CH3)2  + 02--. C6H5C(CH3)200H 
The semi-batch reactor used has a volume of 0.4 I, an agitation 
system working at 880 revolutions per minute and operates at 
a constant temperature of 393 K.  Initially, 0.225 I of cumene was 
loaded and oxidation was performed by introducting molecular 
oxygen at a flow rate of 25 I per hour for a time period of three 
hours. 
In  these conditions the partial pressure of the oxygen  has no 
influence on the reaction rate. The activation energy is estimated 
in  16 Kcal/mole and the  reaction  heat in  27.7  Kcal/mole. 
Temperature  dependent  physical  properties  have  been  con-
sidered in the SAFIRE calculations for the three components par-
ticipating in the reaction.  For the simulation of the semi-batch 
operation it has been necessary to perform a code modification 
which will be briefly described in the next section. Fig. 15 shows 
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Fig.  15- Comparison between SAFIRE calculations and 
experimental data concerning a chemical reaction 
(cumene hydroperoxidation) the comparison between the experimental data /9/ and the results 
calculated by SAFIRE.  The small overprediction could be due 
to  the  formation  of  secondary  products  (acetophenon, 
dimetilphenilcarbinol, ... )which have not been  modeled in  the 
computer calculation. 
d.  SAFIRE extension to  semi-batch reactors 
The original version of SAFIRE accomodated only batch reac-
tors.  In  order to extend the modelling capabilities of the code 
to include semi-batch reactors the JRC developed a modified ver-
sion /6/. The energy and mass balance equations were chang-
ed by introducing the terms concerning the input flow of up to 
three  components  during  the  operation.  The  input  section 
modified requires the following data: 
NOF  = number of input flows (maximum value  =  3) 
for each flow: 
MEX (I) 
START (I) 
STOP (I) 
TEMP  (I) 
IGAS  (I) 
MEX (I,J) 
=  total mass of the flow I to be  introduced 
=  initial time for the introduction of the flow I 
=  final  time for the introduction of the flow I 
=  temperature of the  input flow I 
=  flow phase  indicator ( = 1 gas;  = 2 liquid) 
=  mass fraction of each component in the input flow 
(J = 1,  NC;  NC =total number of components) 
·The subroutines modified are KINPAC,  DIFFUN and HEATUP. 
The validity of this development has been verified so far only 
for the cumene hydroperoxidation  reaction. 
DIERS  Users Group (DUG) 
The  JRC  as  member of the  DUG,  has presented two papers 
("JRC programme in RR-studies" and ''JRC experience with the 
computer code SAFIRE") in the DUG-meeting of 3/5.03.87 at San 
Diego, where also the FAI bench scale apparatus VSP was pro-
pagated, which is an essential tool for collecting data, needed 
by SAFIRE  in  order to  perform emergency relief and venting 
analysis. 
European  Contact Group  on  Runaway Reactions 
The «European Contact Group on Runaway Reactions» (ECG-RR) 
of interesting institutes and industry partners aims to serve for 
fruitful  input and exchange of knowledge in  this field to make 
the experiments more significant. 
The first meeting of the ECG-RR  has been held in  19/20.03.87, 
during which was decided to split up group for the time being 
for practical reasons into two ad hoc working groups dealing with 
MPMC  resp.  FIRES. 
Conclusions 
The  realisation of the FIRES  is  in  state of progress:  ready are 
bunker basement,  chemical  lab.,  auxiliary  rooms,  mechanical 
structure, reactor with auxiliary equipment, early warning systems 
and parts of the control and data acquisition system, of the in-
strumentation and  of the simulator. 
The MPMC studies has been based in the following three aspects: 
- Phenomenological study of the influence of the geometry and 
physical properties on  two-phase fluid  flow regimes 
- Depressurisation  tests  with  water  as  reference  tests  for 
multiphase-multicomponent investigations 
- Parametric studies with SAFIRE 
The  phenomenological  studies  showed  for  a  wide  range  of 
change of viscosity (up to 300 times of the viscosity of water) 
and moderate change of surface tension (half of that of water) 
a very strong effect on the pattern configuration. These investiga-
tions will be continued with forced convection of the fluid com-
ponent. 
Since the depressurisation tests with demineralised water have 
been  performed  in  order  to  produce  reference  maps  for 
multiphase-multicomponent flow investigations, emphasis was 
given  on  the  accurate  measurement  of the  flow  and  state 
characteristics in  the venting line and reaction vessel varying 
vessel and back pressure, filling rates of the reaction vessel and 
venting tube geometry. 
The feasibility study of a large scale facility for simulation and 
real reaction, venting and quenching of reaction products in case 
of uncontrolled runaway has been  continued. 
The  modelling  work  performed  was  concentrated  on  the 
parametric studies with the SAFIRE code. Comparison tests with 
the depressurisation measurements with demineralised water are 
initiated. On the basis of the JRC experience gained so far with 
the computer code SAFIRE through comparisons with experimen-
tal  data and other code calculations, the following preliminary 
conclusions can be reached: 
- SAFIRE  can successfully reproduce experimental data con-
cerning water depressurisation tests 
- SAFIRE  calculations compare satisfactorily with other code 
calculations 
However, the code does have inherent limitations and these must 
be considered: 
- SAFIRE presents a menu of models which have to be selected 
by  the  user.  This  means  that  the  code  has  marked  user-
dependent predictive capabilities. 
- SAFIRE requires a temperature-dependent characterisation of 
the material properties and an  accurate identification of the 
chemical kinetics. 
These data are available for well-known products only and are 
lacking  for others. 
- SAFIRE is a zero-dimension code and cannot take into account 
all  the geometry-dependent effects. 
- SAFIRE  cannot model  non-equilibrium phenomena 
Nevertheless SAFIRE is an original and to some extent unique 
calculation  tool  which  can  be  satisfactorily  employed  if  ap-
propriate engineering judgement is used.  · 
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1954. EXPLORATIVE STUDIES 
Emergency  Planning 
STATUS AND  TRENDS  IN  EMERGENCY  PLANNING 
Since the beginning of the first pluriannual research programme 
on  industrial hazards, JRC started investigating R&D  needs for 
improvement of design and actuation of emergency plans. 
In particular the problems connected with the development and 
use of advanced informatic tools for emergency management, 
and,  with  the  needs  for  measures for  risk  communication  in 
emergencies were selected, among other topics, as subjects for 
more in  depth investigations. 
These problems appeared, indeed, to present on the one hand, 
a general interest for different kinds of emergencies and, on the 
other, to have direct links with parallel activities being carried 
out  under  other  headings  of  the  programme:  such  as  risk 
analysis, accident data bases, decision support systems for risk 
management, and, general support to risk regulation underway 
in  the Community. 
In addition to these particular investigations, it was deemed useful 
to complete identification of possible future research needs for 
the other aspects involved in  effective emergency planning. 
This reason motivated the JRC first to organize a rather restricted 
Brainstorming  on  the  Research  Needs (lspra,  13-14 January 
1987), /1/ then to collaborate with DG  XI  in  the organisation of 
the European Conference on Emergency Planning for Industrial 
Hazards, which was held in Varese (1),  on 4-5 November 1987. 
This latter event was launched by the Commission to assess the 
state of the art in  implementing the articles of the post-Seveso 
Directive,  concerning  the  establishment plans  and to identify 
needs for harmonisations of the approaches going on in the EC. 
This paper is aimed at outlining the major outcomes of the ac-
tivities carriet out. It first summarised the results of the two events 
mentioned above, then discusses the insights obtained by the 
main  studies  performed;  finally,  it  points out  the  principal  in-
vestigation lines which might further be explored by forthcom-
ing  activities. 
Survey of  Emergency  Planning  Status and  Needs  for 
Improvements 
The status of emergency planning in  Europe has been derived 
from the Varese Conference /2/ which also confirmed the results 
of the experts' brainstorming. Both events covered topics such 
as national  regulations and practices; design and implementa-
tion of on-site and off-site emergency plans; auditing and exer-
cising;  lessons  learnt  from  real  emergency  management; 
modelling, monitoring, informatic and rescue tools; communica-
tion to the public both before and after an incident and decision 
making. 
Despite different legal background and organisational structures, 
it appeared that much effort has been devoted to comply with 
the obligations resulting from the Seveso Directive, which are 
certainly producing positive effects. Of course, full implementa-
tion of the Directive requirements was easier, where there was 
already  a  suitable  framework  in  existence.  The  discussions 
however showed that some common problems do exist, which 
call for further work on the improvement of emergency plann-
ing  systems. 
Reference  standards  for  safety  distances,  allowable  toxicity 
levels,  and  similar things need to be harmonised in  the Com-
munity. 
The question of prepardness with respects to contents of safety 
reports  (worst case vs  probable  accident  scenarios)  has  not 
received a satisfactory answer during the conference. 
Another interesting aspect is the integration of emergency plan-
ning for industrial areas involving plants whist not being covered 
by the Directive, but having the potential to provoke or to ag-
grevate emergencies. 
Very often monitoring or identifying the substances released dur-
ing  an  accident has  caused problems. 
The connections between on-site emergency (i.e. control room) 
and the decision of external alerting or interventions should be 
better analysed. 
Modelling and simulating emergencies conditions for assessing 
adequateness of envisaged measures. Auditing of emergency 
planning is not yet a well established subject. On-line predictive 
capability models and their integration in  emergency manage-
ment tools are being studies and significant improvements may 
be expected in the future. Experience from remote handling gain-
ed in other fields should be exploited for robotising particular in-
tervention tools. 
Decision making in emergency still appeared to be a difficult and 
therefore critical issue, for instance when and how to evacuate, 
how to ensure a consistent and non contradictory collection of 
data from  all  available sources,  responsibility structures etc. 
Decision support tools and easy accessibility to data bases, which 
at the moment are at a study level, can be expected in tRe future 
to play an  important role  during emergencies. 
Finally, the problems connected with risk communication prior 
to and during a real emergency, in all their implications (failure 
of communication channels, media and type of communication, 
the need to inform the public without provoking rejection versus 
technological systems etc.) appeared of major concern both for 
the authorities and the  industrialists. 
On these two last topics further indications have been derived 
by the studies summarised in  the following. 
Advanced  Information Technology for  Emergency 
Management 
Evaluation of the use of expert systems for data base system 
development and emergency management was the subject of 
a  study  sponsored  by  JRC  and  performed  at  RIS¢  by  J. 
Rasmussen  et al.  /3/. 
The  study  is  very  instructive  since,  before  proposing  purely 
technological approaches, it analyses in depth the problem do-
main  in  emergency management and the desired features for 
a decision support system: the problem  is  to design systems 
which are also effective during situations which have not been 
foreseen design, and which are not familiar to the user. In addi-
tion, such systems will be operated by a wide variety of users 
whose background and formalisation of needs are poorly known. 
39 In such cases a model or conceptual framework must be used 
which describes the interaction  in  terms of related categories 
defining the boundaries of a design envelope within which users 
can generate effective ad hoc tactics suited to their subjective 
preferences. 
Therefore an  in  depth analysis of decision process, goals and 
constraints, strategies and information retrieval organisation for 
effective use of relevant data bases in  emergencies has been 
performed. 
The  resulting theoretical framework has been confronted with 
a real  legislative and practical approach, i.e.  the organisations 
of emergency management in Denmark, with lessons learnt by 
analysis of selected accidents, and, finally, with interviews of ex-
perts actually involved in emergencies (fire and civil defence of-
ficers). 
The conclusion from the study indicate that 
•  the recent development of advanced information technology, 
together with the trend towards more cognitively oriented ap-
proaches to studies of decision making, offer promising lines 
of development of improved tools for emergency management; 
•  the structure of the decision making process involves multi-
ple responsabilities, at different locations (front-line, operational 
centre etc.): the literature reviews and experts' interview have 
revealed  no  model  of real  life distributed decision  making, 
which will be adequate for the design of support of the deci-
sion  process. 
This  is  clearly a topic for future  research; 
•  data  bases  and  different  sources  of  information  useful  in 
emergencies are being established including accident descrip-
tion, results of risk studies, material characteristics etc. Benefit 
might be gained from improved and more integrated data base 
design, from expert system features. Such aspects can be fur-
ther investigated; 
•  on the other hand tools for design of data bases for distributed 
decision making are now becoming available from the artificial 
intelligence research. 
As  a  result  it  can be  recommended  to direct efforts towards 
models, integrated data base designs and informatic system ar-
chitectures for the organisation of the distributed data bases and 
the coordinated information emergency retrieval necessary for 
effective management. 
Risk  Communication 
Recent legislative trends in the European Community and in the 
United States are to require that industry and government pro-
vide those exposed to the risks of industrial activities and pro-
ducts  information  about  the  nature  of  those  risks.  These 
requirements have emerged as one of the central features of 
industrial risk management. The activity of providing risk infor-
mation is commonly known  as  risk  communication and  it  has 
become a new research area as people realise the difficulties 
of communicating complex technical information, with a strong 
emotive· dimension, to lay people. 
To  evaluate these developments the JRC sponsored research 
/4/ to  provide  an  overview and  analysis  of the  industrial  risk 
management function, its goal, and the intrinsic and extrinsic fac-
tors which influence decision making in the firm. The emergence 
of risk communication policies in the EC and in the USA are view-
ed in terms of theories, legal developments and implementation. 
The main differences are in the public's right to information in 
the US, which must be supplied by industry, as compared to the 
EC situation where industry supplies information to the compe-
tent authorities who, in turn, inform the public on a more restricted 
basis.  In contrast to Europe,  risk communication in the US ap-
pears to be increasingly viewed as an alternative to more tradi-
40 
tional  forms  of  regulation.  In  both  contexts  there  is  tension 
between  industry's  concern  about  the  confidentially of trade 
secrets and the requirement to provide public information about 
specific  substances  and  quantities  of  materials  used  in 
manufacture. 
In another study sponsored by the JRC /5/ the technical problems 
of formulating and communicating risk information were analys-
ed. Literature relating to risk communication in the fields of deci-
sion  research,  educational  psychology,  warning  systems and 
health education, among others, was reviewed and some sug-
gestions  made to improve hazard communications. 
The Seveso Directive specifies that people likely to be exposed 
to hazard in  an  accident be informed of the behaviour to take 
in  an emergency. This brings up the unexpectedly complicated 
question of how to package information so that people will ac-
cept it as being credible. Beyond this, it must be  phrased in  a 
comprehensible way that it can be understood easily and retained 
for possible later use. Even more important, assuming that com-
munications have been  understood and  remembered,  people 
must still be willing to comply with the advice given should an 
emergency arise. 
The  provision of hazard  information can be  divided into three 
categories: information provided to inform people about measures 
taken to prevent hazards (pre-pre information); information pro-
vided on  how to act should an accident happen (pre-post infor-
mation); and information during management of the emergency 
after an accident has occurred (post-post information). A further 
distinction is  that information can be provided to people in  an 
active way, or passively in the sense that the information is made 
available if people take the initiative to seek it out. 
There is still considerable work to be done in this area, for ex-
ample,  in  linking  communication  acceptance  to  institutional 
credibility and in understanding the relationship between the ac-
ceptance and retention of information and the expectations of 
the audience. A study /6/ was carried out to assess the effec-
tiveness of media communications for improved emergency com-
munications. 
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This is the sixth and last progress report of the four year (1984-1987) research programme 
«Industrial Hazards», carried out at the lspra Establishment of the Joint Research Cen-
tre of the Commission of the  European Communities. 
In this fairly new area for JRC  research are considered the risks associated with the 
operation of hazardous industries, such as processing and energy, and a large techno-
logical system (such  as  transportation). 
The programme is focused on  risk associated with major accident, as problems asso-
ciated with diffuse risk have been considered in the JRC Environmental Protection Pro-
gramme.  Moreover,  this  R &  D  area overlaps  in  many  points  the  analogous  area 
extensively investigated at JRC on  safety of nuclear energy. Therefore, the first crite-
rion in setting up this programme has been the best use of the experience and compe-
tence gained by JRC nuclear safety and environmental research groups. The second 
criterion has been to support, where needed and possible,  the Commission policy on 
major industrial hazards. Some of the proposed activities will be carried out in  close 
collaboration with DG  XI  (which is responsible for the development of this policy) and 
with experts from research institutes and industry and with the shared-cost multiannual 
programme on Major Technologies Hazards managed by the DG XII/E which comple-
ments and augments the current activities of the JRC to form a coherent whole. 
The JRC research programme Industrial Hazards consists of three research activities: 
1.  Industrial Safety and Reliability Assessment, 2.  Management of Industrial Risk,  and 
3.  Experimental and Theoretical Studies on Runaway Reactions. The  activities 1 and 
2 aim at the development of methods for the assessment of major risks  in  industrial 
plants and regional industrial systems, while activity 3 has in view to understand how 
an accident can develop, when initiated, and how its consequences can be limited by 
suitable provisions. 
This report summarises the results obtained so far on the above mentioned activities. 